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ABSTRACT
Blanton, Marina V. Ph.D., Purdue University, August, 2007. Key Management in
Hierarchical Access Control Systems. Major Professor: Mikhail J. Atallah.
In a hierarchical access control system, users are partitioned into a number of
classes – called security classes – which are organized in a hierarchy. Hierarchies arise
in systems where some users have higher privileges than others and a security class
inherits the privileges of its descendant classes. The problem of key assignment in
such systems is how to assign cryptographic keys to users and resources to properly
enforce access rights. Its crucial goal is eﬃciency: the number of keys a user ob-
tains, computation a user performs, and amount of resources the server is required to
maintain should be minimized.
In this work, we present a fully-dynamic and very eﬃcient solution to the key
assignment problem that is also provably secure for a strong notion of security. We
then show how the model can be extended to time-based policies where users obtain
access rights only for a speciﬁc duration of time, and subsequently present our time-
based key assignment solution. Finally, we explain how similar techniques can be
used to eﬃciently enforce access control policies in geo-spatial systems and describe
our construction for such systems as well.1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Access Control for User Hierarchies
The problem of key management in hierarchical access control is important for
many applications and has received signiﬁcant attention in the research literature. In
this framework, all users are divided into disjoint access classes – so called security
classes – and each access class has a set of resources associated with it. Hierarchies of
classes arise when a class inherits the privileges of its subordinates, and thus a user
at a speciﬁc class obtain access to the resources at her own class and all descendant
classes in the hierarchy. The model is such that resources are kept encrypted under
certain keys, and access to a decryption key implies access to the resources secured
with that key.
In such systems, when a user joins a class, she is given secret information that will
permit her to access resources at her own and all descendant classes in the hierarchy.
For eﬃciency reasons, access is often based on key derivation: users receive one or
a small number of keys that allow them to obtain access to the authorized objects
without interacting with the server, through a key derivation process. It is clear that
low requirements allow a scheme to be used in a much wider spectrum of devices and
applications (e.g., inexpensive smartcards, small battery-operated sensors, embedded
processors, etc.) than costly schemes. Thus, the objective of key management in
hierarchical systems is to assign keys to users and resources such that access rights
are eﬃciently and correctly enforced.
Eﬃciency in key management schemes is usually measured by a number of criteria,
which are (in order of signiﬁcance):
• The number of secret keys (or the size of private information) each user must
store;2
• The amount of computation a user needs to perform to obtain access to the
desired resource;
• The work needed to perform when the hierarchy or the set of users change and
the degree to which users’ private keys are aﬀected;
• The size of information the system must maintain.
Security of access control systems comes from their ability to deny access to unau-
thorized data. For example, in our model a user is not authorized to access resources
stored at classes other than its own class and its descendants. Furthermore, it is
normally necessary for a key assignment scheme to be collusion-resilient. This means
that even if a number of users with access to diﬀerent classes conspire, they cannot
get access to more resources than what they can already legitimately access. Even
though some key assignment schemes might be intended to be used with tamper-
resistant hardware, a number of prior publications (e.g., [1, 2]) suggest that com-
promising cards is easier than is commonly believed. In addition, the property of
collusion-resilience allows us to use the schemes with other devices that do not have
tamper-resistance.
There is a wide range of applications where such access hierarchies ﬁnd its use.
They include:
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) models, which are useful for many types of
organizations with various access constraints. In such systems users are natu-
rally organized in a hierarchy of classes, and a user higher up in the hierarchy
inherits privileges of its descendant classes.
• Subscription-based services such as newspapers and magazines, pay TV, etc.,
where subscription packages are organized in a hierarchy based on the resources
included in each package. For instance, a Gold package will include everything
available in a Silver package and additional premium services; a user with access
to the news and sports sections will be placed in a class which inherits privileges
of both news-only and sports-only classes; etc.3
• Digital repositories such as music collections, digital libraries, etc., where users
are granted access at diﬀerent levels.
• Project development, where users’ views are organized in a hierarchy and each
user obtains access to the resources determined by her role in the project. For
example, the managerial view will include the views of developers assigned to
the project and possibly other data.
• Defense in depth, where at each stage of intrusion defense there is a speciﬁc set
of resources that can be accessed.
• Cryptographic directories or ﬁle systems, where access is similarly based on a
hierarchical relationship between users.
and others. Even more broadly, hierarchical access control is used in operating sys-
tems (e.g., [3]), databases (e.g., [4]), and networking (e.g., [5,6]).
Normally, an access hierarchy can be modeled as a directed access graph (DAG) G,
where each node corresponds to an access class and edges preserve relations between
the nodes (i.e., in many cases hierarchies are more general than trees). A naive but
simple solution to the key management problem in a hierarchy is then to assign a key
to every access class, and to give a user the keys to all access classes that the user
is entitled to access. Unfortunately, this solution might require each user to store
a prohibitively large set of keys. Thus, key derivation mechanisms are used in the
literature to address this issue.
Among the most eﬃcient solutions in prior work are recent key management
schemes achieve the following properties:
• Each node in the access graph has a single secret key associated with it.
• The amount of public information for the key assignment scheme is asymptoti-
cally the same as that needed to represent the graph itself.
• Key derivation involves only the usage of eﬃcient cryptographic primitives such
as one-way hash functions.4
• Given a key for node v, the key derivation for its descendant node w takes `
steps, where ` is the length of the path between v and w.
In this work we present a solution that preserves all of the above characteristics and
is the ﬁrst to additionally achieve the following properties:
• Provably secure even in the presence of collusion;
• Fully dynamic where no changes to the hierarchy aﬀect secret keys of users;
• Simple and slightly more eﬃcient that previous constructions.
In addition to showing security against key recovery, we deﬁne a stronger notion of
security – key indistinguishability. Under this stronger deﬁnition, all keys a user is
not authorized to have access to are pseudo-random and the user, even if she obtains
a key of its ancestor class, is unable to verify its correctness.
1.2 Deep Hierarchies
Whereas organizations’ role hierarchies tend to be shallow rather than deep, in a
number of contexts the access hierarchies have a large size and depth. These include:
• Hierarchically organized hardware, where the hierarchy is based on functional,
control, and trust considerations;
• Hierarchically organized distributed control structures such as physical plants
or power grids (involving thousands of possibly tiny networked devices such as
sensors, actuators, etc.);
• Hierarchical design structures of large complex systems such as aircraft, VLSI
circuits, etc.;
• Task graphs where descendant tasks are known only to their ancestor tasks.5
Deep access hierarchies can also arise in simple databases where the hierarchical
complexity can come from super-imposed classiﬁcations on the database that are
based on functional or structural features of the database. See also [7,8] for other
examples of deep hierarchies.
One of the key eﬃciency measures for hierarchical access control schemes is the
number of operations necessary to compute the key for an access class lower in the
hierarchy, because this operation must be performed in real-time by possibly very
weak clients. The best schemes require the number of operations linear in the depth
of the graph in the worst case, which for some graphs is O(n), where n is the number
of nodes in the access graph. Thus, a part of this work is concerned with reducing key
derivation time by decreasing the distance between any two nodes in the hierarchy.
This is achieved by inserting additional edges to the hierarchy. In addition to being
useful for reducing key derivation in deep hierarchies, these techniques ﬁnd their uses
in other domains such as adding temporal capabilities to hierarchical systems, which
we introduce in the next section.
As was mentioned above, eﬃciency is achieved by adding additional, so-called
shortcut, edges to the hierarchy. Such shortcut edges preserve the partial order rela-
tionship between the nodes and are in the transitive closure of the graph. In other
words, a shortcut is inserted between nodes v and u only if there is already a (di-
rected) path between these nodes in the hierarchy. Carefully partitioning of the graph
and insertion of such edges into trees and total orders allows us to reduce key deriva-
tion to 3 operations with addition of only O(nloglogn) extra edges. There is also a
tradeoﬀ between the number of extra edges, distance between nodes in the resulting
graph, and complexity of the solution.
For more general graphs, eﬃcient key derivation can be achieved by utilizing the
notion of the dimension of a DAG. The deﬁnition of dimension and the exact bounds
of our construction will be given later in this work.6
1.3 Time-Based Access Control
Now consider the addition of time-based access control policies to hierarchical
systems. That is, as before all users are divided into a set of disjoint classes, but
now a user is granted access to a speciﬁc class for a period of time speciﬁed by its
beginning and end. When a user joins the system, she is given a key (or a set of
keys) which allows her to derive access keys for all resources she is entitled to have
access (i.e., at her own and descendant classes in the hierarchy) only during her time
interval. Note that the time interval is user-speciﬁc and might be diﬀerent for each
user in the system.
There are many applications that follow this model and which would beneﬁt from
automatic enforcement of access policies with temporal constraints through eﬃcient
key management. Such applications, among others, include:
• RBAC models, where, in addition to having a hierarchy of user classes, users
are normally granted their privileges for a speciﬁc period of time depending on
their work schedule, which is well captured by our model.
• Subscription-based services such as digital libraries, music collections, digital
subscriptions to newspapers and magazines, etc. Here a user may be able to
join at any time and/or be able to specify the subscription duration, implying
that access only during a speciﬁc time interval is allowed. Also, subscription
packages are likely to be organized in a hierarchy.
• Content distribution, where users may join at any time and receive content of
varying quality or resolution.
• Cable TV where, similarly, users join at arbitrary times and receive diﬀerent
programs based on what is included in their subscription package.
• Project development, where users’ views are organized in a hierarchy and users
can be assigned to a project only for a speciﬁc duration of time.7
In all of the above examples, we use the current time to enforce time-based policies.
Additionally, instead of being based on the current time, access control policies can
be based on the time in the past and permit access to historical data. For example,
a user might buy access to data such as historical transactions, prices, legal records,
etc. for a speciﬁed time interval in the past, e.g., the year of 1920. These diﬀerent
notions of time can be combined, e.g., a user buys access to 1920 data and is entitled
to access it for two weeks starting from today.
If we let the lifetime of a system be partitioned into m short time intervals, the
existence of time-based access control policies requires the access (or encryption) keys
to be changed at each time interval. In this work, we concentrate on applications
where the system is setup to support a large number of such time intervals. For
example, a video stream might be encrypted with a diﬀerent key every day (thus,
permitting users to subscribe on any given day) or the keys might change even more
often. If the system is setup for a few years, this results in m being in thousands.
Likewise, if the application of interest is access to historical data, say, for the last
century, the number of time intervals will tend to be even higher. Thus, a small
number of keys per user and eﬃcient access with large m’s is our goal.
The notion of security for time-based hierarchical key assignment (KA) schemes
was formalized only recently by Ateniese et al. [9]. Thus, in this work we use their
security deﬁnitions and provide a new eﬃcient solution to the problem of key man-
agement in systems with time-based access control policies. Our solution does not
impose any requirements or constraints on the mechanisms used to enforce policies in
systems where access control is not time-based (e.g., for a hierarchy of user classes).
This means that our solution can be built on top of an existing scheme to make it ca-
pable of handling time (we refer to a scheme without the support for temporal access
control as a time-invariant scheme, and we refer to a scheme that supports temporal
access control policies as time-based). More precisely, we build a solution for a single
access class, and additional functional requirements such as key derivation between8
hierarchically organized access classes can be performed through integration with a
time-invariant scheme.
In a setup with m time intervals, the server is likely to maintain information
which is linear in m. By building a novel data structure, we only slightly increase
the storage space at the server beyond the necessary O(m) and at the same time are
able to achieve other attractive characteristics. In more detail, our solution enjoys
the following properties:
• To be able to obtain access to an arbitrary contiguous set of time intervals, a
user is required to store at most 3 keys.
• Key derivation within the authorized time intervals involves a small constant
number of cryptographic operations and thus is independent of the number of
time intervals in the systems or the number of time intervals in the user’s access
rights.
• The increase of the public storage space at the server due to our solution is only
by a small asymptotic factor, e.g., O(log
∗ mloglogm) with a small constant.
• All operations are extremely eﬃcient, and no expensive public-key cryptography
is used.
We provide several solutions with slightly diﬀerent characteristics, where the diﬀer-
ence is due to the building blocks used in our construction.
While the results given above correspond to a time-based key assignment scheme
with a single resource or user class, we can use them to construct a time-based key
assignment scheme for a user hierarchy. We show that our construction favorably
compares to existing schemes and provides an eﬃcient solution to the problem. Ad-
ditionally, our scheme is balanced in the sense that all resource consumption such as
the client’s private storage, computation to derive keys, and the server public storage
are minimized with tradeoﬀs being possible. This allows the scheme to work even with
very weak clients and not to burden the server with excessive storage. Furthermore,
our scheme is provably secure under standard complexity assumptions.9
1.4 Geo-Spatial Access Control
Finally, in this work we also address the problem of key assignment and derivation
techniques for geo-spatial access control systems. Consider a system where each user
is granted access rights to a speciﬁc area (or a set of areas). As this work is a ﬁrst
solution in addressing this problem in the geo-spatial domain, we consider the case
where the user has access rights to a rectangular section of a larger grid. If a user’s
region is not rectangular, then it can be partitioned into a number of rectangles to
each of which our techniques are applicable.
We envision many applications of this work, including (but not limited to) the
following scenarios:
• Consider a physical facility that houses projects with diﬀerent degrees of sen-
sitivity/conﬁdentiality, with each project assigned its own area. A speciﬁc em-
ployee might have access to certain areas of the building, but not to others. In
this case, the users could be given a smartcard (or some other device) that can
derive the access keys for the areas to which the user has access.
• Consider a geographic information system (GIS) that contains information (e.g.,
demographic, marketing, etc.) about speciﬁc locations. This information may
be interesting to researchers, commercial ﬁrms, and other entities. Thus key
management could be used to provide a subscription-based service where users
purchase access rights to the information about a speciﬁc geographic area.
• There could be a hybrid access control system based on not only location in-
formation, but also on role hierarchies, temporal constraints, or both. As an
example, re-consider the ﬁrst scenario above. It is a reasonable access control
policy that a senior researcher might be able to access a speciﬁc room all of
the time, but a consultant might be able to access the same room during her
work hours. As our scheme extends to higher dimensions, it can be used in such
hybrid frameworks (with time as an additional dimension).10
The key derivation scheme we introduce in this work for geo-spatial grids uses a novel
data structure and achieves the following characteristics for a grid composed of n1×n2
cells (where n1 ≥ n2):
• To obtain access to an arbitrary rectangular subsection, a user is required to
store a constant number of keys.
• Key derivation within the authorized rectangle involves a constant number of
operations (including cryptographic operations).
• The public storage space at the server due to our solution is only O(n1n2 log
∗ n1×
(loglogn1)2) with a small constant involved in the “O(·)” notation.
• All cryptographic operations are very eﬃcient, and no expensive public-key
cryptography is required.
1.5 Organization
Chapter 2 describes literature related to all aspects of this work. In Chapter 3 we
formally deﬁne and present a key assignment scheme for user hierarchies. The solution
consists of a basic scheme, which is then extended to support a stronger notion of
security and full dynamism. In Chapter 4, we present techniques for lowering key
derivation time in deep hierarchies at the expense of increased public storage space
at the server. We also show possible space-time tradeoﬀs.
Chapter 5 extends the time-invariant solution to support temporal constraints.
We describe a scheme that can be used with a single access class and then combine
it with our time-invariant scheme. Next, Chapter 6 shows how enforcement of access
rights in the geo-spatial domain can be achieved. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes our
results and concludes this work.
Most of the material presented here is a joint work with Mikhail Atallah and Keith
Frikken. The work presented in Chapter 3 is also a joint work with Nelly Fazio.
In particular, the key indistinguishability security model, the scheme modiﬁcation11
and the security proof in that model are due to Nelly. Parts of this work appeared
in [10–13], and are a copyrighted material under the ACM and Springer copyright
agreements.12
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Key Assignment in Hierarchical Systems
The ﬁrst work that addressed the problem of key management in hierarchical
access control was by Akl and Taylor [14]. Since then a large number of publications
( [15–43] and others) have improved existing key assignment schemes, especially in the
recent years. All of these approaches assume existences of a central authority (CA)
that maintains the keys and related information. Most of them (and our scheme as
well) are also based on the idea that a node in the hierarchy can derive keys for
its descendants. Due to the large number of previous publications, we only brieﬂy
comment on their basic ideas and eﬃciency in comparison to our scheme. Also,
the work of Crampton at el. [44] provides a more formal categorization of existing
schemes.
A relatively large number of schemes on this topic have been shown to be either
insecure with respect to the security statements made in these works [45–49] or incor-
rect [50]. Therefore, we do not take these schemes into consideration in our further
discussion.
A signiﬁcant number of schemes, e.g., [14,16,19,24,25,27,28,31–34,37], operate on
large numbers computed as a product of up to O(n) coprime numbers or, alternatively,
up to O(n) large numbers, where n is the number of nodes in the graph. Such numbers
can grow to n bits long and are prohibitively large for large hierarchies. While in
many of these approaches key derivation might seem to consist of one division and
one modular exponentiation operation, in practice, division of two numbers even
O(n) bits long involves O(n2) operations, in addition to the use of expensive public-
key crypto operations. More eﬃcient solutions (including ours) have key derivation13
bounded by the depth of the access hierarchy and can be implemented using O(n)
hash operations in the worst case (i.e., when the depth of the hierarchy is O(n)).
Work of [29,35,36] is limited to trees and thus is of limited use. Work of [15,38,40]
is concerned with a slightly diﬀerent model having a hierarchy of users and a hierarchy
of resources. The scheme of [15], however, is not dynamic; and in [38,40] there are high
rekeying overheads for additions/deletions (particularly because of slightly diﬀerent
requirements of the scheme) and the number of keys for a class is large for large
hierarchies.
The work of [23] gives an information-theoretic approach, in which each user
might have to store a large number of keys (up to O(n)), and insertions/deletions
result in many changes. The scheme of [51] uses modular exponentiation, and addi-
tions/deletions require rekeying of all descendants. A number of schemes [17,22,39]
are based on interpolating polynomials and give reasonable performance. In [22,39],
however, private storage at a node is up to O(n) and additions/deletions require
rekeying of ancestors. As was already mentioned above, we avoid rekeying on addi-
tions/deletions and store only one key per node. In [17], key derivation is less eﬃcient
than in our scheme, also public storage space is larger. Even though the authors spec-
ulate that schemes that perform the key derivation process iteratively are ineﬃcient
(which is the case in our and similar schemes), their key derivation is less eﬃcient
due to usage of expensive modular exponentiation operations and interpolating poly-
nomial evaluation.
Schemes that utilize sibling intractable function families (SIFF) [41,42] are the
only eﬃcient approaches among early schemes. In these schemes, there is only one
secret key per class, key derivation is a chain of SIFF function applications which can
be implemented using polynomials. However, additions and deletions in [41] require
rekeying of all descendants and in [42] all descendants should be rekeyed when a node
is deleted.
A number of recent schemes [18,20,21,30,43] use overall structure similar to ours
and have performance comparable to our base scheme. We brieﬂy outline the dif-14
Table 2.1
Comparison of our hierarchical scheme with previous work.
Private Public Changes Proof of Scheme
storage storage
Key derivation
I/D/R security
Lin [30] k 2k|E| (3cH + 4cXOR)` L/NL/L No
Zhong [43] k (k + k1)|E| (cH + 2cXOR)` L/NL/L No
Chien and Jan [20] k k|E| (cH + cXOR)` L/NL/L No
Chen et al. [18] k k|E| (cD + cH + cXOR)` L/NL/L No
Ours k k|E| (cH + cXOR)` L/L/L Yes
ferences between these solutions and ours. The work of Chou et al. [21] does not
address dynamic changes, and the scheme additionally uses modular multiplication.
The scheme of Chen et al. [18] requires larger public storage, key derivation addi-
tionally uses encryption, and the ex-member problem is not addressed (which will
require to rekey all descendants on deletions). Compared to the schemes of Lin [30]
and Zhong [43], our approach is simpler than both of them. It is also more eﬃcient
than the ﬁrst scheme (by a constant factor), and uses less space than both of them
(by a constant factor). In addition, in both of these schemes, all descendants have
to be rekeyed when a class is being deleted to combat the ex-member problem. The
scheme of Chien and Jan [20] uses only hash functions and achieves performance
closest to our base scheme; deletions, however, require rekeying of all descendants.
In our scheme dynamic changes to the graph are handled locally (i.e., private infor-
mation at other nodes is not aﬀected). Another very important distinction between
the present work and these publications is that our scheme is provably secure. In
addition, our extended scheme provides even stronger security guarantees (i.e., key
indistinguishability) that have not been shown before.
Table 2.1 gives a comparison of our basic scheme and other schemes in the litera-
ture. Private storage is measured per access class. Public storage is measured for the
entire access graph (overhead introduced by the scheme, without information needed15
to represent the graph itself), and only the dominant term is given. The key deriva-
tion time shown reﬂects maximum computation needed to derive the key of node w
given the key of node v, assuming there is a path of length ` between v and w.
In the table, k is a security parameter that corresponds to the size of the secret key
(and in most cases is the size of the output produced by a cryptographic hash function
H); k1 is another security parameter (of comparable value); cH denotes computation
required by a single invocation of H1; cXOR corresponds to computation needed to
perform bitwise XOR of two strings; and cD is computation needed for symmetric key
decryption. In the table, changes to the hierarchy include insertion (I), deletion (D),
and re-keying (R); L stands for “local” and NL for “non-local.” In all of the schemes
that list “non-local” for deletions, such operations require re-keying of all descendant
classes in the hierarchy.
Note that in diﬀerent schemes, the authors might make assumptions on what
information is public and what is stored with the client, which diﬀers from what we
present here. For the sake of comparison, however, we unify the schemes and list
their capabilities, which may or may not be diﬀerent from the results reported by the
authors. In addition, results of [20,30] rely on tamper-resistance of the clients.
Most recent developments. As a followup on this work, De Santis et al. [52]
recently developed new solutions to the problem of key assignment in the hierarchy.
Their schemes achieve comparable performance, but rely on a single computational
assumption to achieve security with respect to key indistinguishability.
Among other results that appeared after publication of our initial work [10] are re-
sults of Zych et al. [53], Fuh-gwo and Chun-ming [54], and Vadnala and Mathuria [55].
Here we give a brief description of these schemes.
Construction of Zych et al. [53] involves transforming the hierarchy into a special
form where each node has two parents (called cover various V-posets), assigning
to each node a public-private key pair, and letting two parents to derive a child’s
1Our solution uses a family of pseudo-random functions (PRFs) F to achieve provable security
instead of using H directly. PRFs, however, can be implemented using solely a hash function, and
for the sake of uniformity we list cH for our scheme as well.16
key using Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange protocol. The core diﬀerence of this scheme
from previous solutions is that there is no public information associated with edges,
but rather only public keys associated with nodes. The authors show that any n-
node hierarchy can be transformed into the desired form by using O(n2 loglogn
logn ) extra
nodes in the worst case, and the average-case performance tends to result in addition
of O(n) nodes. Thus, the public storage is lower than schemes that associate a
public label with an edge resulting in O(n2) worst-case public storage. The scheme’s
disadvantage is in slower key derivation: now deriving a child’s key involves modulo
exponentiation and the distance between nodes increases due to insertion of additional
nodes. Changes to the hierarchy are not addressed.
Work of Fuh-gwo and Chung-ming [54] builds on Rabin public-key encryption
scheme [56], where each class has a diﬀerent public-private key parameters. The solu-
tion, however, is unnecessarily complicated, requires each user to store O(n) private
keys (basically keys of all descendant classes in the hierarchy), giving no advantage
over the straightforward solution where each class maintains keys of its descendant
classes. Changes to the hierarchy require users to be re-keyed, plus the security
analysis stated in the paper is incorrect.2
Finally, work of Vadnala and Mathuria [55] gives a solution based on hash func-
tions. In their scheme the key of class j is computed from its parents’ keys as:
Kj = H(H(Ki1||i1||...||im||j)||H(Ki2||i1||...||im||j)||...||H(Kim||i1||...||im||j)||Rj)
where i1,...,im are j’s parents, Rj is a random number associated with class j,
and || denotes concatenation. Key derivation is thus O(n) cryptographic operations
regardless of the depth of the hierarchy. Furthermore, changes to the hierarchy require
user re-keying (while our solution does not). Finally, the authors state that their
2More precisely, a class’s access key is stored encrypted using Rabin encryption, and the authors
postulate that using 10-digit decimal numbers for prime factors p and q is suﬃcient to achieve
security. Decryption of a message in Rabin scheme, however, uses purely computation modulo p or
modulo q and thus simply trying all 1010 possibilities for p and q will give access to a class’s key.17
scheme has lower public storage space requirements compared with our scheme when
the hierarchy is a tree, while the public storage of the schemes is equivalent.3
2.2 Time-Based Key Assignment in Hierarchical Systems
While the list of publications on time-invariant KA schemes is very large, the
number of publications that consider time-based policies and provide schemes for
them is rather modest. The time-based setting and the ﬁrst scheme was introduced
by Tzeng [48]. The scheme, however, was later shown to be insecure against collusion
of multiple users [57]. Subsequent work of Huang and Chang [49], Chien [58], and
Yeh [59] was also shown to be insecure against collusion (in [60], [61,62], and [9],
respectively).
Among very recent publications, Wang and Laih [63] present a time-based hi-
erarchical KA scheme. While their scheme is shown to be collusion-resilient, the
notion of security, however, is not formalized and no clear adversarial model is given
in that work. Tzeng [64] also describes a time-based hierarchical key assignment
scheme, which is used as a part of an anonymous subscription system. The scheme
is proven to resist collusion attacks; however, no formal model of adversarial behav-
ior is provided. The work of Ateniese at el. [9] is the ﬁrst result that provides a
formal framework for time-based hierarchical KA schemes and gives provably secure
solutions, both secure against key recovery and achieving pseudo-random keys. Also,
concurrently with and independently from this work, De Santis et al. [65] provide
new solutions with pseudo-random keys that exhibit performance similar to that of
our scheme.
There is extensive literature on broadcast encryption and multicast security, which
might be considered applicable in this setting as well. There are, however, crucial
diﬀerences in the models, which prevent us from simply using existing solutions from
3Public storage associated with our scheme for an n-node tree is n node labels (one per node) and
n − 1 edge labels (one per edge). In the scheme of [55] there are n random numbers (one per node)
and n node idenitiﬁers. Since labels in our solution play the same role as node identiﬁers in scheme
of [55], there is no beneﬁt in public storage in either scheme.18
those domains. First of all, literature on broadcast encryption and multicast security
provides solutions that permits access to a single resource instead of a hierarchy and
they cannot be composed in an obvious way to provide a solution to our problem.
More importantly, they assume that each client obtains an updated key for each time
interval, which is impossible in our model: no private channels between the server
and a client after the initial issuance of the user keys is assumed, the client is allowed
to remain oﬀ-line, and can access the resources at its own discretion.
The only exception from the above online requirement that we are aware of is the
work of Briscoe on multicast key management [66]. That solution builds a binary
tree from the time intervals, thus achieving O(logn) secret keys and O(logn) key
derivation time. Our solution, on the other hand, provides a constant number of
secret keys and a constant derivation time, thus resulting in superior performance,
which additionally is independent of the number of time intervals in the system.
Time-based key assignment can also be considered related to time-evolving cryp-
tography such as forward-secure and backward-secure encryption and signature schemes.
In such schemes, access to a secret key allows the owner to decrypt (respectively, sign)
messages corresponding to all past or all future time intervals (i.e, access is unidirec-
tional in time). In our setting, however, unidirectional key derivation is not suﬃcient,
which signiﬁcantly complicates the problem. Thus, the closest to our setting are the
schemes that combine forward and backward security, such as key-insulated cryp-
tography [67–69] and intrusion-resilient models [70,71]. The mode of operation in
key-insulated and intrusion-resilient constructions, however, is such that at each time
interval a trusted device transmits a part of the key corresponding to the current time
interval, which allows the user to combine it with another part she has and derive the
current secret key. In our problem, on the other hand, an oﬀ-line mode of operation
is assumed, where no interaction with other parties can be used to derive the key for
the current time interval. In addition, we do not assume trusted devices or parties
once the keys are issued to the user.19
Also, key updating schemes in cryptographic storage systems such as those in
[72,73] give various constructions for performing key updates and derivation. Similar
to forward-secure solutions, the current key allows users to derive keys for all past
time intervals with unidirectional key derivation, which is insuﬃcient in our case.
2.3 Access Control in Geo-Spatial Systems
Using location information for access control, i.e., location-based access control
(LBAC), is not a new concept. The major challenges in geo-spatial computing were
covered in the summary of the recent NRC’s “IT Roadmap to a Geo-Spatial Fu-
ture” [74]. One of the issues mentioned as a future challenge are “ﬁne-grained access
control mechanisms permitting the precise release of location information to just the
right parties under the right circumstances.” Atluri and Chun [75] propose a new
model that supports privilege modes speciﬁc to geo-spatial data and includes geo-
metric considerations (such at the region of overlap between an authorization and
an access request). Similarly Bertino et al. [76] extend the RBAC model to GEO-
RBAC, a model that can deal with geo-spatial information. Other previous work
includes eﬃciently tracking the location of a user [77], models for representing and
evaluating LBAC conditions [78], answering database queries based on location [79],
the introduction of architectures for supporting location-aware applications [80], and
many other important problems. However, we are not aware of any key management
schemes that implement geo-spatial access control policies.20
3 KEY ASSIGNMENT IN HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS
This chapter deﬁnes the problem of key assignment in hierarchical systems and then
presents our solutions.
3.1 Problem Deﬁnition
Suppose that a user hierarchy is modeled as a directed access graph G = (V, E, O),
where V is a set of vertices of size |V | = n, E is a set of edges, and O is a set of
objects associated with the hierarchy. Each vertex v ∈ V represents a class in the
access hierarchy and has a set of objects associated with it. Function O : V → 2O
maps a node to a unique set of objects such that |O(v)| ≥ 0 and ∀v ∈ V ∀w ∈
V, O(v) ∩ O(w) = ∅ iﬀ v 6= w. (For brevity, we use notation Ov to mean O(v).)
When the set of edges E or the set of objects O is not essential to our current
discussion, we may omit it from the deﬁnition of the graph and instead use notation
G = (V, O) or G = (V, E), respectively.
In a directed graph G = (V,E), we deﬁne an ancestry function Anc(v,G) which is
a set such that w ∈ Anc(v,G) if there is a path from w to v in G. We also deﬁne the
set of descendants of node v as Desc(v,G), where w ∈ Desc(v,G) if there is a path
from v to w in G. For a directed graph G = (V,E), we use a function Pred(v,G)
to denote the set of immediate predecessors of v in G, i.e., if w ∈ Pred(v,G) then
there is a directed edge from w to v in G. Similarly, we deﬁne Succ(v,G) to be the
set of immediate successors of v in G. When it is clear what graph we are discussing,
we may omit G from the notation and instead use the shorthand notation Anc(v),
Desc(v), Succ(v), and Pred(v). We consider a node to be its own ancestor and
descendant, but we do not consider it to be a predecessor or successor of itself.21
In the access hierarchy, a path from node v to node w (i.e., v is an ancestor of w)
means that any subject that can assume access rights at class v is also permitted to
access any object o ∈ Ow at class w. The function O∗ : V → 2O maps a node v ∈ V
to a set of objects accessible to a subject at class v (we use O∗
v as a shorthand for
O∗(v)). This function is deﬁned as O∗
v =
S
w∈Desc(v) Ow.
Intuitively, a key allocation mechanism aims at implementing such form of access
control by assigning a cryptographic key kv to each class v. Such key kv is then used to
guard access to objects of class v (for example, by encrypting object o ∈ Ov under key
kv), and is made available to every user at class v (and at any of its ancestor classes).
It follows that each user ought to store (or be able to derive) the cryptographic key kv
associated with the class v to which he belongs, as well as the keys kw of all classes w
which are descendants of v. For the sake of generality, we do not impose any speciﬁc
structure on the secret information actually stored by users at class v; we denote such
information by Sv.
In summary, Sv denotes the secret information that each user at class v stores,
while kv (which is derivable from Sv) is the cryptographic key necessary to gain access
to objects at class v. We formalize this intuition with the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1.1 A Key Allocation (KA) scheme is a pair of polynomial-time algo-
rithms (Set,Derive), deﬁned as follows:
• Set(1κ,G) is a randomized algorithm that on input a security parameter 1κ and
an access graph G, outputs two mappings: (i) a public mapping Pub : V ∪E →
{0,1}∗, associating a public label `v to each node v and a public label yv,w to
each edge (v,w) in the graph; (ii) a secret mapping Sec : V → {0,1}κ ×{0,1}κ,
associating a secret information Sv and a cryptographic key kv to each node v
in G. (No secret information is associated to edges in G.)
• Derive(G,Pub,v,w,Sv) is a deterministic algorithm taking as input the access
graph G, the public information Pub output by Set, a source node v, a target
node w and the secret information Sv of node v. It outputs the cryptographic22
key kw associated to node w if w ∈ Desc(v), or a special rejection symbol ⊥
otherwise.
For correctness, the Set and Derive algorithms of a key allocation scheme should also
satisfy the following constraint: ∀v ∈ V , ∀w ∈ Desc(v),
Pr





kw = Derive(G,Pub,v,w,Sv)
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
(Pub,Sec) ← Set(1κ,G),
(Sv,kv) ← Sec(v),
(Sw,kw) ← Sec(w)





= 1
where the probability is over the random choices of the Set algorithm.
We now formalize two levels of security: key recovery and key indistinguishability.
Deﬁnition 3.1.2 (Key Recovery) A key allocation scheme is secure w.r.t. key re-
covery if no polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage (in the
security parameter κ) against the challenger in the following game:
• Setup: The challenger runs Set(1κ,G), and gives the resulting public informa-
tion Pub to the adversary A.
• Attack: The adversary issues, in any adaptively chosen order, a polynomial
number of Corrupt(v) queries, which the challenger answers by retrieving (Sv,kv)
= Sec(v) and giving Sv to A.
• Break: The adversary outputs a node v∗, subject to v∗ 6∈ Desc(v) for any v
asked in Phase 1, along with her best guess k0
v∗ to the cryptographic key kv∗
associated with node v∗.
We deﬁne the adversary’s advantage in attacking the scheme to be Pr[k0
v∗ = kv∗].
Deﬁnition 3.1.3 (Key Indistinguishability) A key allocation scheme is key in-
distinguishable if no polynomial time adversary A has a non-negligible advantage (in
the security parameter κ) against the challenger in the following game:23
• Setup: The challenger runs Set(1κ,G), and gives the resulting public informa-
tion Pub to the adversary A.
• Phase 1: The adversary issues, in any adaptively chosen order, a polyno-
mial number of Corrupt(v) queries, which the challenger answers by retrieving
(Sv,kv) = Sec(v) and giving Sv to A.
• Challenge: Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over, it speciﬁes a
node v∗, subject to v∗ 6∈ Desc(v) for any v asked in Phase 1. The challenger
picks a random bit b∗ ∈ {0,1}: if b∗ = 0, it returns to A the cryptographic key
kv∗ associated with node v∗; otherwise, it returns to A a random key ¯ kv∗ of the
same length κ.
• Phase 2: The adversary can issue more Corrupt(v) queries, obtaining back
the corresponding key Sv. Note that A cannot ask Corrupt(v) queries for v ∈
Anc(v∗).
• Guess: The adversary outputs a bit b ∈ {0,1} as her best guess to whether she
was given the actual key kv∗ or a random key. A wins the game if b = b∗.
We deﬁne the adversary’s advantage in attacking the scheme to be |Pr[b = b∗] − 1
2|.
Remark. In formalizing the security of a key allocation scheme, Corrupt queries are
answered with respect to the secret info Sv, whereas the Break/Challenge phases
relate to the cryptographic key kv∗. This is because access to an object at class v∗
is granted by the cryptographic key kv∗. Thus, to test the ability of the adversary
to break the access control mechanism, we challenge her to either recover the real
cryptographic key (for key recovery) or to tell the real cryptographic key apart from
some random string (for key indistinguishability).24
3.2 Base Scheme
This section describes our scheme in which every node has one key associated with
it, the public information is linear in the size of the access graph G, and computation
by node v of a key that is ` levels below it can be done in ` evaluations of a pseudo-
random function. Note that pseudo-random functions can be eﬃciently implemented
as, e.g., HMAC [81] built using only a cryptographic hash function or CBCMAC that
utilizes symmetric key encryption. Here we focus on key allocations for a static access
hierarchy. An extension of this scheme is given in Section 3.3, and its support for
dynamic access hierarchies is discussed in Section 3.4.
Our construction is based on the use of pseudo-random functions, which we deﬁne
next.
Deﬁnition 3.2.1 (Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) Family) Let {F κ}κ∈N be
a family of functions where F κ : Kκ × Dκ → Rκ. For k ∈ Kκ, denote by F κ
k :
Dκ → Rκ the function deﬁned by F κ
k (x) = F κ(k,x). Let Randκ denote the family of
all functions from Dκ to Rκ, i.e., Randκ = {g | g : Dκ → Rκ}.
Let A(1κ) be an algorithm that takes as oracle a function g : Dκ → Rκ and returns
a bit. Function g is either drawn at random from Randκ (i.e., g
R ← Randκ) or set to
be F κ
k , for a random k
R ← Kκ. Consider the two experiments:
Experiment Exp
PRF−1
F,A (κ) Experiment Exp
PRF−0
F,A (κ)
k
R ← Kκ g
R ← Randκ
d ← AF κ
k (1κ) d ← Ag(1κ)
Return d Return d
The PRF-advantage of A is then deﬁned as:
Adv
PRF
F,A (κ) =| Pr[Exp
PRF−1
F,A (κ) = 1] − Pr[Exp
PRF−0
F,A (κ) = 1] | .
{F κ}κ∈N is a PRF family if for every κ ∈ N, the function F κ is computable in
time polynomial in κ, and if the function Adv
PRF
F,A (κ) is negligible (in κ) for every
polynomial-time distinguisher A(1κ) that halts in time poly(κ).25
Assume that we are given a PRF family {F κ}κ∈N where F κ : {0,1}κ × {0,1}κ →
{0,1}κ.1 Given an access graph G = (V,E) and a security parameter κ, the Set(1κ,G)
algorithm proceeds as follows:
• For each vertex v ∈ V , pick a unique label `v ∈ {0,1}κ and a random value
Sv ∈ {0,1}κ, then set kv = Sv.
• For each edge (v,w) ∈ E, compute yv,w = kw ⊕ F(kv,`w), where ⊕ denotes
bitwise XOR.
The output of Set(1κ,G) consists of the two mappings Pub : V ∪ E → {0,1}∗ and
Sec : V → {0,1}κ × {0,1}κ, deﬁned as:
Pub : v 7→ `v Pub : (v,w) 7→ yv,w
Sec : v 7→ (Sv,kv)
When a user joins an access class v, she is given secret value Sv for her class. If a user
is assigned access to several classes V 0 ⊆ V , she is given keys for each of her access
classes w ∈ V 0.
We now describe the Derive algorithm. Suppose a user has access to class v and
is in possession of the corresponding key kv. Then to obtain the cryptographic key
kw of a descendant node w, the user sequentially processes every edge (vi,vj) on the
path between v and w. Given an edge (vi,vj) for which both vi’s private key kvi and
the stored public information `vi and yvi,vj are known, we can compute vj’s private
information kvj as kvj = F(kvi,`vj)⊕yvi,vj, using the fact that yvi,vj = kvj⊕F(kvi,`vj).
Due to the sequential nature of key generation on the path between v and w, the
user will be able to derive keys of all necessary nodes and produce key kw.
Example. Figure 3.1 shows key allocation for a graph more complicated than a tree.
First, it is possible for the node with key k1 to generate key k2, because that node
can compute F(k1,`2) and use it, along with the public edge information, to obtain
1To simplify the notation, we will omit the superscript κ from Fκ wherever the security parameter
is clear by the context.26
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y1,2 = k2 ⊕ F(k1,`2) y1,3 = k3 ⊕ F(k1,`3)
y2,4 = k4 ⊕ F(k2,`4) y3,4 = k4 ⊕ F(k3,`4)
Figure 3.1. Key allocation in the base hierarchical scheme for an
example access graph.
k2. The node with k3, on the other hand, cannot generate k2, since this would require
inversion of the F function.
Theorem 3.2.1 The above scheme is secure against key-recovery (per Deﬁnition 3.1.2)
for a DAG G, assuming the security of the pseudo-random function family {F κ}κ∈N
as given in Deﬁnition 3.2.1.
Proof In the security proof, we will follow the same structural approach used in
[82], ﬁrst advocated in [83]. Starting from the actual attack scenario, we consider a
sequence of hypothetical games, all deﬁned over the same probability space. In each
game, the adversary’s view is obtained in diﬀerent ways, but its distribution is still
indistinguishable among the games.
Roughly speaking, proving the theorem amounts to showing that the only way
to break the key recovery security of the base scheme is by breaking the security of
the pseudo-random function F. To accomplish this, we need to show how to turn an
adversary A attacking the scheme into an adversary BF attacking F.
One diﬃculty with this approach is that whereas A can choose which part of the
public info to attack (via the challenge query), the adversaries BF does not have such27
ﬂexibility. The standard way to solve this technical problem is to “guess” the node
v∗ for which adversary A will ask the challenge query and construct adversaries BF
based on the assumption that this guess is correct. In the rest of the proof, we will
assume that we correctly guessed the challenge node v∗. Since such a priori guess is
correct with 1/n probability, this aﬀects the exact security of the reduction proof by
a factor of n.
Let G0 = (V 0,E0) be the subgraph of G induced by restricting the set of vertices
V to the set V 0 of the ancestors of v∗, including v∗ itself. Also, let v1,...,vh be any
topological ordering of the vertices in G0.
To prove the theorem, we deﬁne a sequence of “indistinguishable” games G0, G1,
..., Gh, all operating over the same underlying probability space. Starting from the
actual adversarial game G0 (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.1.2), we incrementally make
slight modiﬁcations to the behavior of the challenger, thus changing the way the
adversary’s view is computed, while maintaining the views’ distributions indistin-
guishable among the games. In the last game, it will be clear that the adversary has
(at most) a negligible advantage. By the indistinguishability of any two consecutive
games, it will then follow that in the original game the adversary’s advantage is also
negligible.
Recall that in each game Gj, the goal of adversary A is to guess the cryptographic
key kv∗ associated with node v∗. Let Tj be the event that k0
v∗ = kv∗ in game Gj. We
then deﬁne the games as follows:
Game G0. Deﬁne G0 to be the original game as described in Deﬁnition 3.1.2.
Game G1. This game is identical to game Game G0, except that in G1 the Set(1κ,G)
algorithm is modiﬁed in such a way that the secret key kv1 of node v1 is never used
in the creation of the public information. Instead, for each edge (v1,vj) in the graph
G coming out of node v1, the public information y1j associated with the edge (v1,vj)
is selected at random from {0,1}κ, i.e., yv1,vj
R ← {0,1}κ.
Note that such modiﬁcation essentially amounts to substituting any occurrences
of the pseudo-random function F(kv1,·) in G0 with a truly random function. Since kv128
does not occur anywhere else in the attack game, such modiﬁcation is warranted by
the security of the PRF family {F κ}κ∈N. In other words, using a standard reduction
argument, any non-negligible diﬀerence in behavior between games G0 and G1 can
be used to construct a PPT algorithm BF that is able to break the pseudo-random
function F with non-negligible advantage. Hence,
￿
￿Pr[T1] − Pr[T0]
￿
￿ ≤ ￿PRF (3.1)
where ￿PRF is the (negligible) advantage Adv
PRF
F,BF(κ) of any PPT adversary BF against
the security of the pseudo-random function F. We now generalize the description of
game G1 to any game in the sequence G1, ..., Gh.
Game Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ h). This game is identical to game Gi−1, except that the
Set(1κ,G) algorithm is modiﬁed in such a way that the secret key kvi of node vi is
never used in the creation of the public information. Observe that the cryptographic
key kvi occurs in game Gi−1 only as the key to the pseudo-random function F(·,·).
In particular, no information about kvi is present in the public information associated
with the edges going into node vi due to the modiﬁcations carried out in games G0,
..., Gi−1 and to the fact that we are working through the ancestors of v∗ in the
topological ordering.
Thus, to change game Gi−1 into game Gi, for each edge (vi,vj) coming out of node
vi, we draw the public information yvi,vj at random from {0,1}κ (rather than com-
puting it as prescribed). Such modiﬁcation amounts to substituting all occurrences
of F(kvi,·) in Gi−1 with a truly random function. Since kvi does not occur anywhere
else in Gi−1, we can conclude (as above) that such modiﬁcation is warranted by the
security of the PRF family {F κ}κ∈N, i.e.:
￿
￿Pr[Ti] − Pr[Ti−1]
￿
￿ ≤ ￿PRF (3.2)
To conclude the proof, observe that no information about the secret key kv∗(= kvh)
is present in the adversary’s view for game Gh. It follows that the probability of a
correct guess for kv∗ by the adversary in game Gh is just 1/2κ, i.e.:29
Pr[Th] =
1
2κ (3.3)
Combining Equation 3.3 with the intermediate results in Equation 3.2, we can con-
clude that:
Pr[T0] ≤
1
2κ + h · ￿PRF.
￿
3.3 The Extended Scheme
We now present an extension of the scheme described in Section 3.2 and prove it
secure w.r.t. key indistinguishability (according to Deﬁnition 3.1.3), without random
oracles. An important feature of this extended scheme is that it permits arbitrary
changes to the hierarchy without aﬀecting secret information stored by the users.
The scheme maintains essentially the same parameters as the one in Section 3.2:
every node has only one random κ-bit key associated with it; the public information
is linear in the size of the access graph G; to derive the key of a descendant node
located ` levels below, computation consists of ` eﬃcient operations. In addition to
using PRFs, the extended scheme makes use of a secure2 encryption scheme E: we
denote with Enc and Dec the corresponding encryption and decryption algorithms.
In details, given an access graph G = (V,E) and a security parameter κ, the
Set(1κ,G) algorithm proceeds as follows:
• For each vertex v ∈ V , ﬁrst pick a unique label `v ∈ {0,1}κ and a random value
Sv ∈ {0,1}κ; then compute tv = FSv(0||`v) and kv = FSv(1||`v).
• For each edge (v,w) ∈ E, compute rv,w = Ftv(`v) and yv,w = Encrv,w(tw||kw).
2We require the encryption scheme to be chosen ciphertext secure; see the deﬁnition in [84].30
The output of Set(1κ,G) consists of the two mappings Pub : V ∪ E → {0,1}∗ and
Sec : V → {0,1}κ × {0,1}κ, deﬁned as:
Pub : v 7→ `v Pub : (v,w) 7→ yv,w
Sec : v 7→ (Sv,kv)
When a user joins a class v, she is then given secret value Sv associated with that
class.
We now describe the Derive algorithm. Given G, the corresponding public infor-
mation Pub, a source node v, a target node w and the secret information Sv of node
v, the cryptographic key kw of node w is derived by considering each edge on the
path3 from v down to w in turn, and repeatedly decrypting the public info associated
to such edge. More precisely, Derive(G,Pub,v,w,Sv) proceeds as follows:
• If there is no path from v to w in G, return ⊥;
• If v = w, retrieve `v from Pub and return kw ← FSv(1||`v);
• Else compute tv ← FSv(0||`v) and let vi = v and tvi = tv; then
repeat
let vj be the successor of vi in the path from v to w;
retrieve `vi and yvi,vj from Pub;
rvi,vj ← Ftvi(`vj);
tvj||kvj ← Decrvi,vj(yvi,vj);
vi ← vj; tvi = tvj;
until vj = w;
return kw.
Figure 3.2 shows how the key derivation mechanism works for the same toy example
given in Figure 3.1.
3If there is more than one path, pick one arbitrarily, e.g., the shortest path from v to w.31
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yi,j ← Encri,j(tj||kj)
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Figure 3.2. Key allocation in the extended hierarchical scheme for an
example access graph.
Next, we prove that the extended scheme described above is key indistinguishable
(per Deﬁnition 3.1.3), following the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1.
Theorem 3.3.1 The above extended scheme is key indistinguishable for any DAG G,
assuming the security of the pseudo-random function family {F κ}κ∈N and the security
of the encryption scheme E.
Proof Roughly speaking, proving the theorem amounts to showing that the only
way to break the key indistinguishability property of the extended scheme is by either
breaking the pseudo-random function F or the encryption scheme E. To accomplish
this, we need to show how to turn an adversary A attacking the scheme into either
an adversary BF attacking F or an adversary BE attacking E.
One diﬃculty with this approach is that whereas A can choose which part of the
public info to attack (via the challenge query), the adversaries BF and BE do not
have such ﬂexibility. As noted in Theorem 3.2.1, the standard way to solve this is to32
“guess” the node v∗ for which adversary A will ask the challenge query and construct
adversaries BF (or BE) based on the assumption that this guess is correct. Thus in
the rest of the proof, we will assume that we correctly guessed the challenge node v∗.
Since such a priori guess is correct with 1/n probability, this aﬀects the exact security
of the reduction proof by a factor of n.
To prove the theorem, we again deﬁne a sequence of “indistinguishable” games
G0,G1,..., where G0 is the actual adversarial game (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.1.3),
and where the adversary’s advantage in the last game will only be negligible. Recall
that in each game Gj, the goal of adversary A is to output b ∈ {0,1} which is her
best guess to the bit b∗ chosen by the challenger in the attack game described in
Deﬁnition 3.1.3. Let Tj be the event that b = b∗ in game Gj.
For clarity of exposition, we ﬁrst discuss two special cases, which exemplify the
most technical aspects of the proof. Afterwards, we describe how the general case is
addressed.
First special case. v∗ is one of the roots4 in G.
Game G0. Deﬁne G0 to be the original game as described in Deﬁnition 3.1.3.
Game G1. This game is identical to game G0, except that in G1 the Set(1κ,G)
algorithm is modiﬁed in such a way that the cryptographic key kv∗ is information
theoretically hidden from the view of adversary A. To achieve this, we compute
tv∗ ← R1(0||`v∗), kv∗ ← R1(1||`v∗)
where R1 : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ is a truly random function. Note that such modiﬁcation
essentially amounts to substituting any occurrences of the pseudo-random function
FSv∗(·) with a truly random function R1(·). Since Sv∗ does not occur anywhere else in
the attack game, such modiﬁcation is warranted by the security of a pseudo-random
function. In other words, using a standard reduction argument, any non-negligible
diﬀerence in behavior between game G0 and G1 can be used to construct a PPT
4By root in a DAG we mean any minimal node in the topological order of G.33
algorithm BF that is able to break the pseudo-random function F with non-negligible
advantage. Hence,
￿
￿Pr[T1] − Pr[T0]
￿
￿ ≤ ￿PRF (3.4)
where ￿PRF is the (negligible) advantage Adv
PRF
F,BF of any PPT adversary BF attacking
the security of the pseudo-random function F.
It remains to notice that in game G1, the challenge no longer contains any infor-
mation about b∗. This is because kv∗ is now a random value, exactly as ¯ kv∗. Moreover,
since v∗ is a root of G, it has no incoming edges and thus the public information Pub
does not contain any label yv,v∗ (which would be an encryption of tv∗||kv∗). Therefore,
kv∗ is independent of any other values in the adversary view, and thus it is indistin-
guishable from ¯ kv∗. It follows that the adversary’s view is exactly the same regardless
of the value of b∗, and thus:
Pr[T1] = 1/2 (3.5)
Combining Equations 3.4 and 3.5, the thesis follows.
Second special case. v∗ has a single predecessor p which is one of G’s roots.
Game G0, Game G1. The ﬁrst two games are deﬁned as in the ﬁrst special case.
Game G
(a)
2 . This game is identical to game G1, except that in Game G
(a)
2 we
further modify the Set(1κ,G) algorithm so that the secret information tp is information
theoretically hidden from the view of adversary A. To achieve this, we compute
tp ← R1(0||`p), kp ← R1(1||`p)
where R1 : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ is a truly random function. Note that such modiﬁcation
essentially amounts to substituting any occurrences of the pseudo-random function
FSp(·) with a truly random function R1(·). Since Sp does not occur anywhere else in
the attack game, such modiﬁcation is warranted by the security of a pseudo-random
function; hence,
￿ ￿Pr[T
(a)
2 ] − Pr[T1]
￿ ￿ ≤ ￿PRF (3.6)
.34
Game G
(b)
2 . To turn game G
(a)
2 into game G
(b)
2 , for any child s of p, we compute
rp,s ← R2(`s)
where R2 : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ is a truly random function. Note that such modiﬁcation
essentially amounts to substituting any occurrences of the pseudo-random function
Ftp(·) with a truly random function R2(·), which is safe since p is a root of G, and
thus tp does not occur anywhere else in the adversarial view (in particular, it is not
encrypted within any label in Pub). Therefore, using a standard reduction argument,
any non-negligible diﬀerence in behavior between game G1 and G
(b)
2 can be used to
construct a PPT algorithm BF that is able to break the pseudo-random function F
with non-negligible advantage. Hence,
￿
￿Pr[T
(b)
2 ] − Pr[T
(a)
2 ]
￿
￿ ≤ ￿PRF (3.7)
Game G
(c)
2 . This game is exactly as G
(b)
2 except that the label yp,v∗ associated with
edge (p,v∗) ∈ E is now computed as
yp,v∗ ← Encrp,v∗($||$)
where $ denotes a random value. Note that this modiﬁcation amounts to changing the
plaintext within a ciphertext, which was encrypted under a key that is independent
from the adversary view (because of the changes in game G
(b)
2 ). Therefore, using
a standard reduction argument, any non-negligible diﬀerence in behavior between
games G
(b)
2 and G
(c)
2 can be used to construct a PPT algorithm BE that is able to
break the security of the encryption scheme E with non-negligible advantage. Hence,
￿
￿Pr[T
(c)
2 ] − Pr[T
(b)
2 ]
￿
￿ ≤ ￿Enc (3.8)
where ￿Enc is the (negligible) advantage of any PPT adversary attacking the security
of the encryption scheme E.
It remains to notice that in game G
(c)
2 , the challenge no longer contains any
information about b∗. This is because the label yp,v∗ of the only incoming edge35
(p,v∗) ∈ E no longer contains any information about kv∗ (after the modiﬁcation in
this game), which is therefore independent from the adversary view. Thus,
Pr[T
(c)
2 ] = 1/2 (3.9)
Combining Equations 3.4, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9, the thesis follows.
The general case. There are no restrictions on the position of v∗ in G.
The second special case demonstrated how to remove from the adversary view’s the
information on kv∗ (which could be leaked by the label yp,v∗ in Pub associated with
the single edge (p,v∗) going into v∗). In the general case, there could be several edges
going into v∗, and, in particular, it is necessary to consider each path going from one
of the roots of G to v∗.
To accomplish this, we start the sequence of games with Game G0 and Game G1
deﬁned as in the ﬁrst special case. Then for each ancestor of v∗ (considered in
turn according to any topological sorting), we introduce three games mimicking the
structure of games G
(a)
2 , G
(b)
2 and G
(c)
2 as deﬁned in the second special case.
At a high level, this can be thought of as a “pebbling argument,” by which we
successively pebble all of the ancestors of v∗, until we reach v∗ itself, according to the
following rules:
1. A node can be pebbled only after all its ancestors have already been pebbled.
2. To pebble a node u, we introduce the games G
(a)
u , G
(b)
u and G
(c)
u in the sequence,
following the same approach employed in the second special case. In particular,
ﬁrst we deﬁne a game G
(a)
u in which the secret information tu is computed as:
tu ← R
(a)
u (0||`u), ku ← R
(a)
u (1||`u)
where R
(a)
u : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ is a truly random function.
Second, we deﬁne a game G
(b)
u in which, for every child s of u, we compute
ru,s ← R
(b)
u (`s)36
where R
(b)
u : {0,1}∗ → {0,1}∗ is a truly random function.
Third, we deﬁne a game G
(c)
u in which we set
yu,s∗ ← Encru,s∗($||$)
where s∗ is the successor of u in the path from u to v∗ and $ denotes a random
value.
Reasoning along the lines of the argument for the second special case, we can argue
that each tuple of games G
(a)
u , G
(b)
u , and G
(c)
u negligibly alters the adversary’s view (by
a term 2￿PRF+￿Enc). Overall, once all of the ancestors of v∗ have been pebbled, we can
argue that no information about kv∗ is present in Pub, and hence kv∗ is independent
from the adversary’s view, and thus is indistinguishable from ¯ kv∗. From this we can
derive that in the last game G
(c)
v∗ ,
Pr[T
(c)
v∗ ] = 1/2 (3.10)
Combining all of the intermediate equations, we can conclude that
Pr[T0] ≤ 1/2 + ￿PRF + nv∗(2￿PRF + ￿Enc)
where nv∗ is the number of ancestors of v∗. This concludes the proof. ￿
3.4 Supporting Changes to the Access Hierarchy
In this section we show how dynamic changes to the access hierarchy, such as
addition and deletion of edges and nodes, as well as replacing a node’s key, are
handled in the scheme of Section 3.3.
Insertion of an edge. Suppose the edge (v,w) is to be inserted into G. First,
compute rv,w = Ftv(`w) and yv,w = Encrv,w(tw||kw). Then, augment Pub to contain
the mapping (v,w) 7→ yv,w.
Deletion of an edge. In deleting an edge, the diﬃculty is in preventing access by
ex-members. Suppose the edge (v,w) is to be deleted from G. Then the following
updates are done: for each node u ∈ Desc(w,G), perform:37
1. Change the label of u, call it `0
u. Note that Su remains unchanged, but the keys
tu and ku need to be recomputed as t0
u = FSu(0||`0
u) and k0
u
. = FSu(1||`0
u).
2. For each edge (p,u) where p ∈ Pred(u), update the value of yp,u to be an
encryption of the newly compute keys, i.e., y0
p,u = Encrp,u(t0
u||k0
u), where r0
p,u =
Ftp(`0
u).
Insertion of a new node. If a new node v is being inserted, together with new
edges into and out of it, then we do the following:
1. Create the node v without any incoming or outgoing edges; this requires just
generating a unique public label `v ∈ {0,1}κ and a random secret value Sv ∈
{0,1}κ, computing kv = FSv(1||`v) and augmenting Pub with the mapping v 7→
`v and Sec with the mapping v 7→ (Sv,kv).
2. Add the edges one by one, using each time the above procedure for edge inser-
tion.
Deletion of a node. Deletion of a node v amounts to the following two steps:
1. Deletion of all of the edges coming into and out of v, using the above procedure
for edge deletion.
2. Removal of the public and secret information associated with v from the maps
Pub and Sec.
Key replacement. Key replacement for a node v is performed as follows:
1. Update the secret information Sv with a new random value S0
v
R ← {0,1}κ.
2. Update the vertex’s keys to t0
v
. = FS0
v(0||`v) and k0
v
. = FS0
v(1||`v).
3. Update Sec to map v 7→ (S0
v,k0
v).
4. For each edge (w,v) (i.e., where w ∈ Pred(v)), compute y0
w,v according to the
new keys t0
v and k0
v and updates Pub to map (w,v) 7→ y0
w,v.38
5. For each edge (v,u) (i.e., where u ∈ Succ(v)), compute y0
v,u according to the
new key t0
v and update Pub to map (v,u) 7→ y0
v,u.
No node other than v is aﬀected.
User revocation. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work on hierarchical access
control considered key management at the level of access classes and at the same time
at the level of individual users. For instance, among the schemes closest to ours, [43]
considers only a hierarchy of security classes without mentioning individual users,
and [30] considers a hierarchy of users without grouping them into classes. However,
it is important to group users with the same privileges together and on the other
hand permit revocation of individual users. In our scheme, revoking a single user can
be done with two approaches:
1. Recard every user at that user’s access class(es), and for all descendants of this
access class(es) perform the operation described for edge deletion (i.e., change
all keys by changing the labels and then update the public information). Note
that the descendants do not have to be rekeyed.
2. Make the access graph such that each user is represented by a single node in
the graph with edges from this node to each of that user’s access classes. By
creating such a graph, removing a user is as easy as removing his node, and
thus does not require rekeying of any other user in the system.
3.5 Other Access Models
Traditionally, the standard notion of permission inheritance in access control is
that permissions are transfered “up” the access graph G. In other words, any vertex
in Anc(v,G) has a superset of the permissions held by v. Crampton [85] suggested
other access models, including:
1. Permissions that are transfered down the access graph. For these permissions,
any node in Desc(v,G) has a superset of the permissions held by v.39
2. Permissions that are transfered either up or down the graph but only to a limited
depth.
In this section, we discuss how to extend our scheme to allow such permissions. We
can achieve upward and downward inheritance with only two keys per node. Also,
we can achieve all of these permissions with four keys at each node for a special class
of access graphs that are “layered” DAGs (deﬁned later) when there is no collusion.
3.5.1 Downward Inheritance
To support such inheritance, we construct the reverse of the graph G = (V,E,O),
which is a graph GR = (V,E0,O) where for each edge (v,w) ∈ E there is an edge
(w,v) ∈ E0. Then we use our base scheme for both G and GR, which results in each
node having two keys, but the scheme now supports permissions that are inherited
upwards or downwards.
3.5.2 Limited Depth Permission Inheritance
We say that an access graph is layered if the nodes can be partitioned into sets,
denoted by S1,S2,...,Sr, where for all edges (v,w) in the access graph it holds that
if v ∈ Sm then w ∈ Sm+1. We claim that many interesting access graphs are already
layered, but in general any DAG can be made layered by adding enough virtual nodes.
Given such a layering, we can then support limited depth permissions. This is
done by creating another graph which is a linear list that has a node for each layer,
and there is an edge from each layer to the next layer. The reverse of this graph
is also constructed, and these graphs are assigned keys according to our scheme. A
node is given the keys corresponding to its layer. Clearly, with such a technique we
can support access rights that permit access to all nodes higher than some level and
to all nodes lower than some level.40
We now show how to utilize these four key assignments to support permission
sets of the form “all ancestors of some node v that are lower than a speciﬁc layer L”
(an analogous technique can be used for permission sets of the form “all descendants
of v above some speciﬁc layer”). Suppose the key for the permission requirement to
access “all ancestors of node v” is kv and the key for permission requirement to access
“all nodes lower than layer L” is kL. Then we establish a key for both permission
requirements by setting the key to F(kv,kL). Clearly, only nodes that are an ancestor
of v can generate kv and only nodes lower than level L can generate kL, so the only
nodes that could generate both keys would be an ancestor of v AND below level L,
assuming that there is no collusion.41
4 IMPROVING EFFICIENCY
The main focus of this chapter is to improve key derivation time in graphs where
the distance between two nodes can be large. Recall that the key derivation time in
the schemes of the previous chapter require the number of operations proportional
to the length of the paths between two nodes. Therefore, if the distance is large
(i.e., the graph is deep), we might want to reduce the distance in order to decrease
computation a user must perform to access resources at a descendant class. Also, the
techniques given in this chapter apply to any graphs not necessarily in the context
of access graphs. Thus, for instance, we are able to utilize these techniques in our
solution to time-based access control given in Chapter 5.
The main idea used here is to insert extra edges, so-called shortcut edges, to
the hierarchy to decrease the distance between nodes. Such edges do not aﬀect the
relationship between the nodes, and thus are in the transitive closure of G. In other
words, we may insert a shortcut edge between nodes v and w only if there is already
a path between the nodes in the original graph G.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst, in Section 4.1, present an eﬃcient solution for hierarchies
that are trees (which also extends to more general graphs), and then, in Section 4.2,
provide another solution for more general graphs, which is based on the notion of
dimension of a graph (deﬁned later). Note that for trees, the ﬁrst construction results
in a more eﬃcient solution, while the latter is designed to support graphs more general
than trees.
4.1 A Solution for Tree Hierarchies
Throughout this section we assume that the access structure is a tree with n
nodes, unless mentioned otherwise. We ﬁrst describe a construction that reduces the42
path between any two nodes (from the worst-case O(n)) to O(loglogn) with O(n)
public space. This construction is given in Sections 4.1.1–4.1.3, where, for clarity of
presentation, with start with a simple construction and gradually improve to result
in the above performance. Then Section 4.1.4 describes an alternative construction
that allows us to achieve the distance of 3 edges between any two nodes with public
storage space (e.g., the number of edges) of O(nloglogn). Finally, in Section 4.1.5
we show how the technique can be extended to more general hierarchies.
4.1.1 A Preliminary Scheme
Our solution uses the notion of a centroid of a tree: A centroid of an n-node tree
T is a node whose removal from T leaves no connected component of size greater than
n/2 [86]. The tree T does not need to be binary or even have constant-degree nodes.
It can be shown that in any tree there are at most two centroids, and if there are two
centroids, then they must be adjacent. If the tree is rooted and has two centroids, we
break the tie by arbitrarily selecting the parent among the two centroids. Thus, we
refer to “the” centroid of a rooted tree.
Our preliminary algorithm AddShortcuts0 for adding shortcuts edges to T is de-
scribed next. It outputs a set of O(nloglogn) edges that reduce the distance between
any two nodes to less than logn edges.
AddShortcuts0(T): For every node v of T, do the following:
1. Let Tv be the subtree of T rooted at v. Compute the centroid of Tv (call it cv).
2. Add a shortcut edge from v to cv (unless such an edge already exists or v = cv).
3. Remove from Tv its subtree rooted at cv. Note that the new Tv is now at most
half its previous size (and could in fact be empty if v = cv).
4. Repeat the above process for the new Tv until the ﬁnal Tv is empty.43
The number of shortcut edges leaving each v in the above algorithm is no more than
logn because each addition of a shortcut edge results in at least halving the size of
Tv. Therefore the total number of shortcut edges is no more than nlogn.
Now we show that the shortcut edges make it possible for every ancestor v to
reach any of its descendants w in a path of no more than logn edges. When we trace
the path from v to w, we distinguish two cases, depending on whether w is in the
subtree of the centroid cv of Tv. The tracing algorithm which we call FindPath0 is as
follows:
FindPath0(v,w,T):
Case 1: w is in the subtree of the centroid cv of Tv. If v 6= cv, we follow the edge
from v to cv and continue recursively from cv. If, on the other hand, v = cv,
then we follow the tree edge from v to the child of v whose subtree contains w
and continue recursively from that child node.
Case 2: w is not in the subtree of cv in Tv. We recursively continue with a Tv that
is “truncated” by the (implicit) removal of Tcv from it (i.e., it is now half of its
previous size).
The fact that the path traced by the above algorithm consists of no more than logn
edges follows from the observation that every time we follow an edge (whether it is a
tree edge or a shortcut edge), we end up at a node whose subtree is at most half the
size of the subtree we started at.
4.1.2 Improving the Time Complexity
Before describing an improvement to the above scheme, we need to review the
concept of centroid decomposition of a tree. If we compute the centroid of a tree,
then remove it, and recursively repeat this process with the remaining trees (of size
no more than n/2 each), we obtain a decomposition of the tree into what is called44
a “centroid decomposition.” Such a decomposition can be easily computed in linear
time (see, for example, [87]).
Our improved scheme is based on doing a pre-processing step of T that consists of
performing what we call a “prematurely terminated centroid decomposition.” This
is similar to standard centroid decomposition, except that we stop the recursion not
when the tree becomes a single node, but when the tree size becomes at most
√
n.
This means that there are at most
√
n successive centroids that are aﬀected by this
prematurely terminated decomposition (as opposed to n of them for the standard
decomposition). We call these centroids, as well as the root of T, special nodes.
Note that by our construction removing the special nodes from T leaves no connected
components of size larger than
√
n each; let us call these connected components
(which are trees) the “residual” trees and denote them by T1,...,Tk.
We also use the notion of a “reduced tree.”. The reduced tree ˆ T consists of the
special nodes and of edges (v,w) that satisfy the following conditions: (i) v is an
ancestor of w in T, and (ii) there is no other node of ˆ T on the path from v to w in T.
Now we are ready to describe the overall recursive procedure for adding shortcut
edges. In what follows, |T| denotes the number of vertices in T.
AddShortcuts1(T):
1. If |T| ≤ 4, then return an empty set of shortcuts. Otherwise continue with the
next step.
2. Compute the special nodes of T. Initialize the set of shortcuts S to be empty.
3. Create from T the reduced tree ˆ T, and add to S a shortcut edge between every
ancestor-descendant pair in ˆ T (unless the ancestor is a parent of the descendant,
in which case there is already such an edge in T).
4. For every residual tree Ti in turn (i = 1,...,k), add to S a shortcut edge from
the root of Ti to every node in Ti that is not a child of that root.45
5. For every residual tree Ti in turn (i = 1,...,k), recursively call AddShortcuts1(Ti).
If we let Si denote the set of shortcuts returned by that recursive call, then up-
date S by setting S = S ∪ Si. Return S.
The number of shortcut edges added in Steps 3 is O(|T|) (since there are O(
p
|T|)
special nodes) and in Step 4 is
Pk
i=1 |Ti|, which is ≤ |T|. The overall recursive
procedure then obeys the following recurrence, where f(|T|) is the number of shortcut
edges we are introducing:
f(|T|) =

 
 
0 if |T| ≤ 4
f(|T|) ≤ c1|T| +
k P
i=1
f(|Ti|) if |T| > 4
Here every Ti has size ≤
√
n and c1 is a constant. A straightforward induction proves
that this recurrence implies that f(n) = O(nloglogn), which is the size of the public
information due to the creation of shortcut edges.
Next, we show that for every ancestor-descendant pair (v, w) in T, there is now
a path of length O(loglogn). Our algorithm for ﬁnding such a path mimics the
recursion of AddShortcuts1. In what follows, we use Dist(n) to denote the distance
between any ancestor and descendant in the graph after generating shortcuts using
AddShortcuts1(T).
FindPath1(v,w,T):
1. If |T| ≤ 4, then trace a path from v to w along T and return that path. If
|T| > 4, continue with the next step.
2. If v and w are both special in T, then return the edge (v,w). If v and/or w is
not special, then proceed to the next step.
3. Let Ti be the residual tree containing v, and let Tj be the residual tree containing
w. If i = j, then we recursively call FindPath1(v,w,Ti) and return the path the
call returns.If i 6= j, then we proceed as follows:46
(a) We recursively call FindPath1(v,u,Ti), where u is the node of Ti nearest to
w in T (hence u is a leaf of Ti, and one of its children u0 in T is a special
node that is an ancestor of w in T). This path is the initial portion of
the path P from v to w that will be returned by this algorithm (P will be
further built in the steps that follow).
(b) Follow the edge in T from u to the special node u0 that is ancestor of w in
T, and append that edge (u,u0) to P.
(c) Follow (and append to P) the edge in ˆ T from special node u0 to the special
node (call it x) that is the special ancestor of w nearest to it (i.e., x is
parent of the root of the residual tree Tj that contains w). (Note that such
an edge exists because of Step 3 of AddShortcuts1(T).) If x = w, then
return P, otherwise continue with the next step.
(d) Follow (and append to P) the edge in T from x to the root of Tj.
(e) Follow (and append to P) the edge from the root of Tj to w; such an edge
exists because of Step 4 of AddShortcuts1(T). Return P.
Note that in the above algorithm, the path returned in Step 3 when i = j has length
≤ Dist(|Ti|) ≤ Dist(
p
|T|) and, likewise, the path returned in Step 3(a) has length
≤ Dist(|Ti|). Then the recurrence for Dist implied by the above algorithm is:
Dist(|T|) =



Dist(|T|) ≤ c2 if |T| ≤ 4
Dist(|T|) ≤ c3 + Dist(
p
|T|) if |T| > 4
where ci’s are constants. A straightforward induction proves that this recurrence
implies that Dist(n) = O(loglogn), which is the worst-case key derivation time.
4.1.3 Improving the Space Complexity
In this section we further lower performance of the key assignment scheme by
reducing the public information (i.e., the number of edges in the graph) to O(n).47
Similar to the solution of the previous section, we begin with a pre-processing
step that consists of performing “prematurely terminated centroid decomposition” of
T, except that now we stop the recursion not when the tree becomes of size ≤
√
n,
but when the tree size becomes ≤ loglogn. This means that there are at most
O(n/loglogn) successive centroids that are aﬀected by this new form of prematurely
terminated decomposition, which we call distinguished nodes altogether with the root
of T. Note that removing these distinguished nodes from T leaves no connected
components of size larger than loglogn each; we call these connected components
(which are trees) “tiny trees.”
We also use the notion of a “reduced tree” T 0 that is conceptually similar to the
ˆ T of the previous section: The nodes of T 0 are the distinguished nodes, hence there
are O(n/loglogn) of them. The edges of T 0 satisfy the following condition: there is
an edge from node v to node w in T 0 if and only if (i) v ∈ Anc(w,T), and (ii) there
is no other node of T 0 on the path from v to w in T.
Our ﬁnal AddShortcuts algorithm is then as the following:
AddShortcuts(T):
1. Compute the distinguished nodes of T. Create T 0.
2. Use the method of Section 4.1.2 on the tree T 0. Any edge of T 0 that was not in
T must be considered a new (i.e., a shortcut) edge.
Note that this algorithm uses O(n) public storage, because |T 0| = O(n/loglogn).
To trace a path between any ancestor and descendant nodes, we use the following
algorithm:
FindPath(v,w,T):
1. If both v and w are distinguished nodes, call FindPath1(v,w,T 0). Otherwise,
proceed with the next step.
2. Trace a path in T from v to the nearest distinguished node (call it u) that is
ancestor of w (the length of this path is at most loglogn because the tiny trees48
have size ≤ loglogn). If there does not exist such a distinguished node u that
is both a descendant of v and ancestor of w, then v and w must be in the same
tiny tree. In this case we can directly follow edges of T from v to w and stop.
3. Trace a path in T 0 from u to the nearest distinguished node (call it x) that is
an ancestor of w. If x = w then stop, otherwise continue with the next step.
4. Trace a path in T from x to w (within the same tiny tree).
Since the distance between any two distinguished nodes is at most loglogn−logloglogn,
and the size of each tiny tree is at most loglogn, paths produced in each of the above
steps (and the total paths from v to w) have length O(loglogn).
4.1.4 A Time/Space Tradeoﬀ
In this section we introduce solutions with constant key derivation time. The
idea is that by increasing the space complexity to O(nloglogn) we can reduce the
distance between any ancestor and descendant nodes to at most 3 edges. Like the
scheme described in Section 4.1.2, we start with prematurely terminated centroid
decomposition that stops when the tree size is ≤
√
n. We also use the reduced tree
ˆ T. The approach is as follows.
AddShortcuts(T):
1–4. The same as in the AddShortcuts1(T) algorithm of Section 4.1.2.
5. For every residual tree Ti in turn (i = 1,...,k), add to S a shortcut edge from
each node v in Ti (other than the root) to all nodes in ˆ T that are both: (i)
descendants of v and (ii) children of the root of Ti in ˆ T.
6. For every residual tree Ti in turn (i = 1,...,k), recursively call AddShortcuts(Ti)
and, if we let Si be the set of shortcuts returned by that call, update S by setting
S = S ∪ Si. Return S.49
Step 5 of the above algorithm adds at most O(|T|) edges to the shortcut set: all new
edges that point to a single node w in ˆ T come from at most one tree (as w has at
most one parent in ˆ T). And since each tree has at most O(
p
|T|) nodes, there are
at most O(
p
|T|) new edges pointing to w. Finally, the overall O(|T|) bound comes
from the fact that there are O(
p
|T|) nodes in ˆ T.
The total number of edges added to the shortcut set in the above algorithm
follows a recurrence similar to the scheme in Section 4.1.2; thus, this scheme adds
O(nloglogn) edges. Furthermore, the algorithm FindPath(v,w,T) is very similar
to the Section 4.1.2 algorithm. To avoid unnecessarily repeating the techniques, we
describe only the case of FindPath that diﬀers from its previous version. It corresponds
to the situations where v and w are in diﬀerent residual trees and neither of them is
a special node. In this case, it takes at most one hop to get to a special node (call it
u1) that is an ancestor of w (by Step 5 of AddShortcuts(T)). Then we can get to the
special node of the residual tree containing w following a single edge (call this node
u2) by Step 3. Finally, we can reach w from u2 following another edge by Step 4. The
path from v to w is thus v,u1,u2,w.
The above scheme requires three edges to reach a speciﬁc node. It is trivial to
show that a one-hop solution must add O(n2) edges, but a two-hop solution exists
with O(nlogn) public space. Section 4.2 provides more details on shortcut schemes
for total orders with the distance between nodes being diﬀerent small constants. Such
results apply to trees as well (due to the possibility of using centroid decomposition),
and we do not further describe them here.
4.1.5 Extending the Techniques to Other Graphs
In this section, we extend the shortcut techniques beyond tree hierarchies and
introduce an algorithm for adding shortcut edges to general access graphs. This
algorithm can be applied to any hierarchy and addition of shortcuts results in key
derivation being at most O(loglogn) steps. The algorithm, however, guarantees50
eﬃcient storage only for certain hierarchies, speciﬁcally, if the number of nodes with
multiple parents is relatively small (for instance,
√
n). We believe that this limited
notion of an access graph captures many real life access hierarchies, and the results
of Section 4.2 can be applied to hierarchies where this is not the case.
Suppose we are given a transitively-reduced1 access graph G = (V,E). Let M
denote the set of nodes in G with multiple parents. Deﬁne the set of edges EM to be
the set of edges in E that are incident on one or more nodes in M. The AddShortcuts
algorithm then works as follows:
AddShortcuts(G):
1. Invoke the algorithm of Section 4.1.3 on the graph G0 = (V −M,E−EM). Note
that this graph is a forest of trees (since the nodes in M have been removed).
Let E1 denote the set of new edges returned by the algorithm.
2. Add a set of edges, call it E2, that form the transitive closure of M. That is, if
given two nodes v,w ∈ M, where v 6= w, v ∈ Anc(w,G), and (v,w) 6∈ E, then
add edge (v,w) to E2.
By the correctness of the AddShortcuts algorithm of Section 4.1.3, any ancestry rela-
tion in the graph formed in Step 1 is captured by a path of length O(loglogn) and
|E1| = O(|E − EM|) = O(n). The shortcut edges added to G are E1 ∪ E2, and the
new graph is GS = (V,E ∪ E1 ∪ E2).
To show the correctness of this algorithm (i.e., to show that if there is path from
node v to node w in GS, then there is a path from v to w in G), we must illustrate
that every added edge is part of the transitive closure of G. Observe that by the
correctness of the previous scheme, this is true for every edge in E1. Furthermore, it
is clearly true for edges in E2, since the edges are added to E2 only when the source
is an ancestor of the destination.
1The transitive reduction of a graph G is the smallest graph R(G) such that C(G) = C(R(G)),
where C(G) is the transitive closure of G.51
We also need analyze the space complexity of the algorithm. We have |E1| = O(n)
and |E2| = O(|M|2). Thus, there will be at most O(n+ |M|
2) new edges introduced.
And if |M| is relatively small, e.g., O(
√
n), then the space complexity is O(n).
Now we show how the FindPath algorithm works in this case, resulting in paths
of length O(loglogn) between any pair of an ancestor and descendant in G.
FindPath(v,w,GS): There are 3 cases to consider:
1. There is no node from M on the path from v to w (including v and w them-
selves). Then there will be a path from v to w in G0 = (V − M,E − EM), and
we can use previous FindPath(v,w,G0
S) procedure to produce a path of length
O(loglogn) from v to w.
2. All paths from v to w contain at least one node from M, but there is a path
from v to w with a single node from M on it. Let us for now assume that neither
v nor w is in M. Then there will be a path v,...,u1,m,u2,...,w such that
m ∈ M. In this case v can reach u1 with O(loglogn) hops by executing the
previous FindPath(v,u1,G0
S) algorithm, u1 can reach m following a single edge,
m can reach u2 following a single edge, and u2 can reach w with O(loglogn)
hops by executing previous FindPath(u2,w,G0
S). The case where v or w is in M
easily follows from the above.
3. All paths from v to w contain at least two nodes in M. Similar the previ-
ous case, we describe what needs to be done when neither v nor w is in M;
cases when v and/or w is in M directly follow from this description. Let
v,...,u1,m1,...,m2,u2,...,w be such a path where m1,m2 ∈ M and no node
between (v and u1) and (u2 and w) is in M. Note that v can reach u1 by calling
previous FindPath procedure in O(loglogn) hops, u1 is within one edge from
m1, m1 is within one edge from m2 (because of the edges in E2), m2 is within
one edge from u2, and u2 can reach w in O(loglogn) hops by calling FindPath
of Section 5.3.
It is clear that this algorithm returns paths of length O(loglogn).52
4.2 A Solution for More General Hierarchies
Our construction for more general graphs is based on the notion of the dimension
of a graph, which we deﬁne shortly. For d-dimensional graphs, the basis of our solution
includes a reduction to the (d−1)-dimensional case. Thus, in this section we provide
solutions to one-dimensional case (Section 4.2.2) and then give a dimension reduction
technique (Section 4.2.3).
For the one-dimensional case, we describe solutions where any two nodes are at
most 2 edges away, 3 edges away, etc. For higher dimensions, the essence of our
technique consists of three main components:
1. The addition of new “dummy” vertices that make it possible to add a small num-
ber of shortcuts to achieve the desired fast-key-derivation performance. Note
that the dummy vertices and their associated keys are internal to the system
(used purely for performance reasons) and that no access classes correspond to
them. Unlike the previous section where shortcut edges were in addition to the
original edges of the hierarchy, here the only explicit edges that remain are the
shortcut edges (some of them may, of course, coincidentally correspond to edges
in the original graph, but this is not required). The addition of dummy vertices
and shortcut edges is a novel technique, and we believe it has much promise
beyond enabling the speciﬁc performance bounds that we achieve in this work.
2. As our techniques could be cumbersome to apply to (and later use on) the
original graph, we operate on a diﬀerent representation of the graph. Namely,
we need to “transform” the graph into a d-tuple-representation of the vertices
where d is its dimension. Such transformation step is not needed if the graph is
already speciﬁed in the d-tuple form, e.g., policies of the form “node v is ancestor
of node w iﬀ v has both a higher value than w and is also less vulnerable than
w.” We believe this representation of the access graph will have uses other than
the present framework of key assignment and derivation.53
3. With the above representation, it becomes possible to carry out the desired
computation of dummy vertices and shortcut edges with very eﬃcient perfor-
mance. We provide an algorithm for achieving this and prove precise bounds
for it, both in terms of its consumption of resources (time and space) and in
terms of the key-derivation performance made possible by the data structure
that it produces.
4.2.1 Background
An n-vertex access hierarchy G is a partial order; and any partial order can be
represented as the intersection of t total orders, with the smallest t for which this is
possible being the dimension of the partial order (see, e.g., [88,89]). That is, it is
possible to associate with every vertex v of G a t-tuple (xv,1,...,xv,t) such that:
1. Every xv,j is an integer between 1 and n.
2. If v 6= w, then xv,j 6= xw,j, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
3. Node v is ancestor of node w in G if and only if xv,j > xw,j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
We denote the dimension of G by d(G), or by d when G is understood. While
computing the dimension of an arbitrary partial order is NP-complete [90], and even
approximating it to within a constant factor is not known to be in P, the dimension
of many access hierarchies is small. For instance, the dimension of a tree is 2. Also,
it was shown in [91] that a G whose transitive reduction is planar has dimension
at most 3 (and the 3-tuples representing it are computable in linear time). If the
transitive reduction of G is 4-colorable, then its dimension is at most 4 [91]. Many
access hierarchies are 4-colorable, especially those for organizational hierarchies.
There are, however, some hierarchies with higher dimension. For example, in the
Bell-LaPadula model with k categories (denoted by s1,...,sk) and ` classiﬁcations
(denoted by c1,...,c`), the dimension of the lattice is k + 1. Fortunately, computing
the tuple representation for this model is straightforward: The access level ci with54
categories in the set S is converted into a tuple (i,x1,...,xk) where xi = 1 if and only
if si ∈ S, and is 0 otherwise. It is not diﬃcult to verify that this conversion correctly
implements the access control policy.
We may actually not need to compute the dimension, but rather any d0-tuple
representation of the graph with a small enough d0. Moreover, some access graphs
can naturally be speciﬁed in such a tuple representation, when, for instance, the
“ancestor” relationship is the conjunction of a number of total-order conditions such
as “v has higher security clearance than w,” “v is a higher-priority asset than w,” “v
is more vulnerable than w,” “v is a higher-paying class of subscribers than w,” etc.
In summary, the techniques of this section generalize the shortcut technique to any
access hierarchy where a tuple-based representation (of reasonable dimension) can be
found. This signiﬁcantly extends the results of the previous section that supports
trees.
4.2.2 The One-Dimensional Case
In this section we present our techniques for the one-dimensional case. In what
follows, let the nodes (i.e., access classes) form a one-dimensional graph (i.e., a total
order) and be numbered v1 through vn. Furthermore, the access rights of node vi are
a superset of the access rights of node vj if and only if i ≤ j. We may sometimes refer
to nodes with lower indices as nodes “on the left” and to nodes with higher indices
as nodes “on the right.”
Following the approach of the previous section, we add shortcut edges to the
graph corresponding to the user hierarchy to lower key derivation time. As before,
such shortcut edges should preserve the original relationship between the nodes in
the graph and thus must satisfy the constraint of (i) reachability: given two nodes vi
and vj where i < j, there is a path from vi to vj; and (ii) security: there is a path
from vi to vj only if i < j.55
Given a set of edges E that satisfy the above constraints, we denote the minimum
path length between two nodes vi and vj by dist(vi,vj); this distance is inﬁnity if
i > j. Then for our graph, the distance between any pair of nodes is bounded by
maxvi,vj∈V,i<j dist(vi,vj). We say that a shortcut scheme is an h-hop solution if no
two nodes’ distance is more than h, i.e., maxvi,vj∈V,i<j dist(vi,vj) ≤ h. In other words,
an h-hop solution produces graphs of diameter h. Our goal is to determine a small
set of edges that results in an h-hop solution.
The transitive closure of the directed acyclic graph results in a one-hop solution
with O(n2) edges, and it can easily be shown that this solution is an optimal (in
terms of number of edges) one-hop solution. Thus in the remainder of this section we
concentrate on solutions with more than a single hop which use much less space.
Two-Hop Solutions
Here we present a shortcut scheme where the distance between any two nodes is
at most two edges. This solution requires addition of O(nlogn) edges to the original
graph. This bound can also be proven to be optimal for any two-hop solution.
AddShortcuts2(G):
1. Let n denote the number of nodes in G. If n ≤ 3, then add edges between
consecutive nodes and quit. Otherwise, proceed with the next step.
2. Find the median node, i.e., the node that is dominated by about half of the
nodes and that dominates the other half; denote this median node by m. Place
the nodes that dominate m in a set L; and place the nodes dominated by m in
a set R.
3. For each node vi ∈ L, create a shortcut edge (vi,m).
4. For each node vi ∈ R, create a shortcut edge (m,vi).
5. Create a graph GL from the nodes in L and execute AddShortcuts2(GL).56
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Figure 4.1. Addition of shortcut edges for the two-hop one-dimensional solution.
6. Similarly for R, create a graph GR and execute AddShortcuts2(GR).
Figure 4.1 depicts the ﬁrst level of recursion for the above procedure.
It can easily be shown that, in the above-deﬁned structure, the nodes in the graph
are at most two hops from each other. That is, suppose nodes v and w are separated
by some median m during the above protocol. Then clearly there is a path of length
two from v to w (speciﬁcally, v to m to w). On the other hand, if v and w are never
separated by a median, then from the base case (Step 1) the nodes will have a path
of length at most two.
The space required by the solution follows a simple recurrence f(n) = O(1) for
n ≤ 3, and f(n) = O(n) + 2f(n/2) otherwise. It is straightforward to show that
f(n) = O(nlogn).
Creation of a data structure with two-hop paths implies that we also need a
constant-time algorithm for ﬁnding it. That is, we need a FindPath2(v,w,G) proce-
dure that, given two nodes v and w, ﬁnds a path consisting of two edges from point
v to point w. To achieve this, we store the recursion tree (call it RT) for the above
AddShortcuts2 algorithm, which takes no more space than storing the shortcut edges.
The two-hop path we seek would be easy to ﬁnd if we could, in constant time, com-
pute the lowest node (call it u) of RT for which v and w are a part of that node’s
sub-problem: the shortcut edges (v,m) and (m,w) are available at the node u in RT,
where m is the median of node u’s subproblem. Fortunately, computing u is easy to57
do in constant time, by making use of the results of [92] that showed that in any tree
it is possible to answer nearest common ancestor (NCA) queries in constant time. In
more detail, given any two nodes of RT, their common ancestor in RT that is nearest
to them can be computed in constant time (in fact, doing so is rather straightforward
for our construction where RT is a complete binary tree). In our case, the two nodes
whose NCA we seek are the leaves of RT that contain v and w, and their NCA is the
node u that contains the two shortcut edges that we want.
Three-Hop Solutions
In this section, we describe a shortcut scheme where nodes are separated by
at most three hops. In Section 4.1 we gave a scheme for trees that introduced
O(nloglogn) shortcut edges. While trees have dimension d = 2, we cannot use
these techniques for the case of d = 2, because not all graphs of dimension two are
trees. Thus, we adopt that solution to the one-dimensional case and, for complete-
ness, brieﬂy describe the scheme next. We would like to note that this bound is
asymptotically optimal for any three-hop solution.
For ease of presentation, the procedure below is given for the case n = 22q
. This
allows us to avoid using ﬂoor/ceiling functions, but does not narrow the applicability
of the solution.
AddShortcuts3(G):
1. Let n denote the number of nodes in G. If n ≤ 4, then add edges between the
consecutive nodes. Otherwise, proceed with the next step.
2. Create a set of special nodes S that consists of every
√
nth node in the graph.
That is, initialize S with {vn} and then add nodes vn−j
√
n for all j such that
j
√
n < n (note that j <
√
n). Let us refer to this set as S = {vi1,...,vim},
where i1 < i2 < ··· < im.58
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Figure 4.2. Addition of shortcut edges for the three-hop one-dimensional solution.
3. Insert new edges between the nodes in S to form the transitive closure of the
set (i.e., now the nodes in S are one hop away from each other).
4. For each node vi 6∈ S, if a node vj ∈ S exists such that j < i and i < j +
√
n,
insert an edge (vj,vi) if it is not already present.
5. For each node vi 6∈ S, ﬁnd vj ∈ S such that i < j and j < i +
√
n, insert an
edge (vi,vj) if it is not already present.
6. Form a subgraph Gj from the nodes between vij and vij+1 and the edges that
preserve their ordering. Also, construct a subgraph G0 from the nodes before vi1
and the edges connecting them. Execute AddShortcuts3 on graphs G0,...,Gm−1
to recursively add shortcut edges to them.
Figure 4.2 depicts diﬀerent stages of the above algorithm for the ﬁrst level of recursion.
The top ﬁgure gives the original hierarchy, the middle ﬁgure shows the hierarchy after
selection of special nodes and constructing their transitive closure, and the bottom
ﬁgure shows the hierarchy after adding shortcut edges to and from the special nodes.59
To demonstrate that in the above data structure the nodes are at most three hops
from each other, we consider all cases. Clearly, in the base case (Step 1), nodes are
at most three hops from each other. Also, if nodes v and w (where v is left of w) are
separated by a special node, then v can reach its nearest special node u1 in at most
one hop (from Step 5), u1 can reach the special node u2 that is rightmost special node
before w in at most on hop (from Step 3), and u2 can reach w in at most one hop
(from Step 4). Finally, if v and w do not fall in the base case of Step 1, they will
always be separated by a special node due to the recursive nature of the algorithm.
The space required by the solution easily follows the recurrence f(n) = O(1) for
n ≤ 4, and f(n) = O(n) +
√
nf(
√
n) otherwise. It is straightforward to show using
induction that f(n) = O(nloglogn).
Similar to the previous case of the two-hop solution, the existence of a three-
hop path is not enough: we also need a constant-time algorithm for ﬁnding it. The
FindPath3(v,w,G) procedure for doing this is very similar to the FindPath2(v,w,G)
that we gave for the two-hop case. In more detail, we ﬁnd the NCA (call it u) of
the two leaves of RT that contain v and w and the nodes u1 and u2, such that edges
(v,u1), (u1,u2), (u2,w) are in G and are available at u (from the shortcut edges added
the AddShortcuts3(G) procedure).
Four or More Hop Solutions
The three-hop solution presented in the previous section gives us a template for
designing schemes with three or more hops. Suppose that an h-hop solution (h > 2)
is desired, then we can use the following algorithm for adding shortcuts to G:
AddShortcutsh(G):
1. Let n denote the number of nodes in G. If n ≤ h + 1, then add edges between
the consecutive nodes. Otherwise, proceed with the next step.
2. Partition the nodes into n
m cells of size m each. Declare the last node in every
cell to be a special node, and add all of the special nodes to a set S.60
3. Use the scheme that provides an (h − 2)-hop solution to connect the nodes in
S. That is, execute AddShortcutsh−2(GS), where GS consists of the nodes of S
and the edges that deﬁne the relationship between the nodes.
4. For each non-special node v 6∈ S, add an edge from it to its nearest special node
on the right.
5. For each non-special node v 6∈ S, add an edge from the nearest special node on
the left (if one exists) to it.
6. Recursively add shortcut edges to each cell (ignoring the special nodes) by
executing this algorithm on each of them.
The number of edges in the above scheme follows the recurrence f(n,h) = O(n) +
f(n/m,h − 2) + (n/m)f(m,h). For h = 4 and m = logn, this leads to f(n,4) ≤
O(n) + (n/logn)f(logn,4) (recall that f(n,2) = O(nlogn)). Now, it can be shown
that f(n,4) = O(nlog
∗n).
The constant-time procedure for computing the four-hop path between any two
nodes is very similar to the one given for the two-hop case: The whole recursion tree
RT is stored, and a constant-time NCA computation is used to get to the node of RT
at which the nodes u1 and u2 of the four-hop path x,u1,m,u2,y can simply be read.
The node m is retrieved from the recursion tree of GS using NCA computation. For
any general h, FindPathh(v,w,G) will have O(h) complexity.
O(log
∗ n)-Hop Solutions
We brieﬂy point out here that any O(1)-hop scheme of edge complexity O(nlog
∗n)
(such as the scheme given above) can be used to build an O(log
∗n)-hop scheme of
O(n) edge complexity as follows. Let S consist of every (jlog
∗n)th node of the input
total order, 1 ≤ j ≤ m = n/log
∗n. This S induces a partition of the n-node chain
into (at most) m+1 blocks G1,G2,...,Gm+1 of size ≤ log
∗n each. We build a linear
chain of size m on S and use the constant-hop solution on that chain. This allows61
Table 4.1
Performance of shortcut schemes for one-dimensional graphs.
Private Key Public
Scheme
storage derivation storage
2HS 1 2 op. O(nlogn)
3HS 1 3 op. O(nloglogn)
4HS 1 4 op. O(nlog
∗ n)
log
∗HS 1 O(log
∗n) op. O(n)
us to achieve the distance of 4 edges between nodes of S at an edge complexity of
O(mlog
∗m), which is O(n). The key derivation between two nodes in the same block
is done in ≤ log
∗ n hops by following each edge within that block. Given node v in
Gi, derivation of the key of node w in Gj, i < j, is done by ﬁrst (i) following edges
in Gi from v to the vertex u1 ∈ S that is at the boundary of Gi and Gi+1; then (ii)
using a 4-hop derivation within S to go from u1 to the vertex u2 ∈ S that is at the
boundary of Gj−1 and Gj; and ﬁnally (iii) following edges in Gj from u2 to w. The
total number of hops in that case is therefore ≤ 2log
∗n + 4.
Summary of One-Dimensional Solutions
Table 4.1 shows a summary of one-dimensional schemes described here. In the
table, we denote by sHS a solution where the distance between any two nodes (i.e.,
the diameter of the graph) is at most s, i.e., a so-called s-Hop Scheme.
Shortcut schemes have also been considered in prior literature ( [93–97]), and the
following results (explored in a diﬀerent domain) are available for trees which also
coincide with solutions for one-dimensional graphs. Lowering the diameter to 4 or 5
edges requires addition of Θ(nlog
∗ n) edges, lowering the diameter to 6 or 7 edges
requires addition of Θ(nlog
∗∗ n) edges, etc.62
Table 4.2
The number of edges in one-dimensional h-hop solutions.
No. of Diameter of the graph
nodes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 45 19 17 15 14 13 13 13 9
25 300 74 61 49 46 43 43 42 40
50 1225 193 146 119 110 98 95 92 92
100 4950 480 342 264 245 218 209 197 194
250 31125 1503 997 724 685 587 562 527 512
500 124750 3498 2173 1538 1427 1223 1184 1086 1061
750 280875 5737 3408 2375 2186 1870 1804 1651 1620
1000 499500 7987 4666 3241 2941 2537 2426 2222 2183
2500 3123750 23417 12912 8652 7542 6618 6198 5704 5556
5000 12497500 51822 27379 18144 15334 13651 12541 11617 11197
Throughout the rest of this work we may use S1(n) to denote any shortcut scheme
for graphs of dimension 1 applied to a total order of size n. We also use space(S1(n))
and time(S1(n)) to denote its public storage and key derivation complexity, respec-
tively.
To make the numbers more concrete, we performed simulation experiments to
determine the minimum number of shortcut edges that are required to reduce the
distance between nodes in an n-node one-dimensional graph to no more than h hops.
In such experiments, we used the transitive closure and the scheme of Section 4.2.2
to achieve 1-hop and 2-hop graphs, respectively. For the simulations of schemes with
more than two hops, we used the generic scheme of Section 4.2.2. In the case of the
generic scheme, to choose the number of groups to use, we performed an exhaustive
search to ﬁnd the number that minimized the number of edges. Table 4.2 shows the63
number of edges from our simulation results for schemes with the maximum of 1 to
9 hops.
4.2.3 Higher Dimensions
We give a solution for graphs of dimension d that achieves key derivation of no
more than (and typically less than) 2(d − 1) + h1(n) steps, where h1(n) denotes the
distance between two nodes in the underlying one-dimensional scheme for an n-node
graph. As before, each step in key derivation corresponds to following one shortcut
edge. The public space used in this scheme is O(f1(n)(logn)d−1), where f1(n) denotes
the space complexity (i.e., the number of edges) of the underlying one-dimensional
scheme.
Rather than immediately giving the solution for an arbitrary dimension d, for
clarity of exposition, we ﬁrst present the solution for d = 2. Once the intuition and
the basic construction have been presented for d = 2, we give the general construction
for arbitrary d.
The Case of Dimension 2
The fact that the graph G has dimension 2 implies that every vertex v can be
replaced by a pair of numbers (x(v),y(v)), such that w is an ancestor of v in G if
and only if w dominates v, i.e., x(w) ≥ x(v) and y(w) ≥ y(v). From now on, for
convenience, we refer to “points” rather than “vertices.” A shortcut is then an ordered
pair of points w,v describing an extra “key-derivation edge” that will be added from
point w to point v.
The input is a set V of n points in 2-dimensional space, and the desired output
includes a set S of shortcuts between pairs of points (some of which may not belong
to V ) such that (i) |S| = O(f1(n)logn), and (ii) given any pair of points v,w ∈ V
such that w dominates v, there is a path of at most h1(n) + 2 shortcut edges from64
w to v. The output also includes the set P that contains V as well as the additional
dummy points (i.e., points not in V but that are touched by edges in S).
The solution steps are as follows:
AddShortcuts(G):
1. Initialize P = V and initialize S to be empty.
2. If |V | = 1, then return P and S; otherwise continue with the next steps.
3. If |V | > 1, then compute a median line M that is perpendicular to the y axis
and partitions V into two equal sets V1 and V2, where V1 (V2) is left (resp.,
right) of M. Let V 0
1 (V 0
2) be the projection of V1 (resp., V2) on line M.
4. Add to S the following shortcut edges:
– a shortcut edge from every point of V 0
1 to its corresponding point of V1;
– a shortcut edge from every point of V2 to its corresponding point of V 0
2.
5. Recursively build the shortcut edges and dummy points for the set V1. Let that
recursive call return P1 as the set of points (including dummies) and S1 as the
set of shortcut edges within P1. Update S and P as follows: S = S ∪ S1 and
P = P ∪ P1.
6. Recursively build the shortcut edges and dummy points for the set V2. Let that
recursive call return P2 as the set of points (including dummies) and S2 as the
set of shortcut edges within P2. Update S and P as S = S∪S2 and P = P ∪P2.
7. Solve the one-dimensional problem consisting of V 0
1∪V 0
2 using one of the schemes
of Section 4.2.2. Let this return a set of edges S3 (note that it returns only a
set of edges, i.e., it does not add any dummy points). Update S as S = S ∪S3.
(P stays the same.)
The space complexity (i.e., the number of shortcut edges and dummy points) of the
above-described scheme obeys a recurrence of the form f(n) ≤ 2f(n/2) + cf1(n)65
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Figure 4.3. Example two-dimensional access hierarchy (original).
for some constant c if n > 1; and f(n) = O(1) if n = 1. The resulting solution is
O(f1(n)logn). Note that this recurrence follows from Step 4 (which recursively solves
the problem for (n/2) points), Step 5 (which recursively solves the problem for (n/2)
points), Step 7 which adds f1(n) edges, and Step 1 which uses O(n) points.
The length of the path between any w and v can be proved to be at most h1(n)+2
by induction on n (the base case is trivial). That is, if w ∈ V2 and v ∈ V1, then the
path of length at most h1(n) + 2 consists of one edge from w ∈ V2 to its projection
w0 ∈ V 0
2, at most h1(n) edges from w0 to the point v0 ∈ V 0
1 that is the projection of v
on M, and one edge from v0 to v. When both points v and w are in V1 or both are
in V2, the claim follows from the induction hypothesis.
Example. To help clarify our technique, we give an example of the recursive step of
the above AddShortcuts algorithm. Figure 4.3 shows a tree access hierarchy that will
be used for this example.
Figure 4.4 contains a set of points in two dimensions that represents a tree’s
access structure. Note that if a point dominates another point in this ﬁgure, then the
dominating point must have a path to the dominated point in the ﬁnal structure.
Figure 4.5 shows the shadow points (added in Step 3 of the algorithm and denoted
by open circles) for the previous ﬁgure. Note that the shadow points are on a one-
dimensional plane (i.e., a line). This ﬁgure also shows the transitions from normal
points to shadow points and vice versa (as described in Step 4). Also note that the
shadow points will be linked in Step 7.66
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Figure 4.4. Example two-dimensional access hierarchy converted to tuple form.
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Figure 4.5. Example two-dimensional access hierarchy with shadow points.
The Case of Dimension 3 and Higher
The fact that the graph G has dimension d implies that every vertex v can be
replaced by a d-tuple of numbers (x1(v),...,xd(v)), such that w is an ancestor of v
in G if and only if w dominates v, i.e., xi(w) ≥ xi(v) for all i ∈ {1,...,d}.
The input is a set V of n d-dimensional points, and the desired output includes
a set S of shortcuts between pairs of points (some of which may not belong to V )
such that (i) |S| = O(f1(n)(logn)d−1), and (ii) given any pair of points v,w ∈ V67
such that w dominates v, there is a path of O(d+h1(n)) shortcut edges from w to v.
The output also includes the set P that contains V as well as the additional dummy
points (i.e., points not in V but that are touched by edges in S).
As was the case with the 2-dimensional solution, we use a recursive construction.
Speciﬁcally, we inductively assume that the (d−1)-dimensional problem can be solved
with addition of O(f1(n)(logn)d−2) edges achieving the distance of 2(d − 1) + h1(n)
between the nodes (note that this holds for d = 1 and for d = 2 by the previous
subsections). The solution steps are as follows:
AddShortcuts(G):
1. Initialize P = V , and initialize S to be empty.
2. If |V | = 1, then return P and S; otherwise continue with the next step.
3. If d = 1, then solve using any of the one-dimensional schemes; otherwise con-
tinue with the next step.
4. If |V | > 1, then compute a (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplane M, perpendicular
to the dth dimension, that partitions V into two equal sets V1 and V2, where
V1 is the set of points that are on the smaller side of the hyperplane (according
to their dth coordinate). Let V 0
1 be the projection, along dimension d, of V1
on hyperplane M, and let V 0
2 be the projection of V2, along dimension d, on
hyperplane M.
5. Add to S the following shortcut edges:
– a shortcut edge from every point of V 0
1 to its corresponding point of V1;
– a shortcut edge from every point of V2 to its corresponding point of V 0
2.
6. Recursively build the shortcut edges and dummy points for the set V1. Let that
recursive call return P1 as the set of points (including dummies) and S1 as the
set of shortcut edges within P1. Update S and P as S = S∪S1 and P = P ∪P1.68
7. Recursively build the shortcut edges and dummy points for the set V2. Let that
recursive call return P2 as the set of points (including dummies) and S2 as the
set of shortcut edges within P2. Update S and P as S = S∪S2 and P = P ∪P2.
8. Solve the (d−1)-dimensional problem consisting of V 0
1∪V 0
2 using the solution for
dimension d−1, then update P and S according to what this solution returns:
If it returns S3 and P3, then the updates are S = S ∪ S3 and P = P ∪ P3.
The space complexity (i.e., the number of shortcut edges and dummy points) obeys
the following recurrence. If n > 1, then f(n,2) ≤ c1f1(n)logn; if d > 2, then:
f(n,d) ≤ 2f(n/2,d) + f(n,d − 1) + c2dn.
This recurrence follows from Steps 5 and 6 (which each recursively solve the problem
for n/2 points in d dimensions), Step 7 (which recursively solves a problem for n
points in d − 1 dimensions), and the other steps add at most O(n) points and edges.
Now if n = 1, then f(1,d) = c3d. Thus, the solution to the above recurrence is:
f(n,d) = O(df1(n)(logn)
d−1).
The w-to-v number of edges obeys the following recurrence: If n > 1, then h(n,2) ≤
h1(n) + 2; if d > 2, then
h(n,d) ≤ 2 + h(n,d − 1).
The above recurrence follows from the following number of edges: one edge from V2
to a shadow point, h(n,d − 1) edges on the (d − 1)-dimensional hyperplane in Step
7, and one edge from the shadow point to the destination point.
Now, if n = 1 then h(1,d) = 1. Thus, the solution to the above recurrence is:
h(n,d) ≤ 2(d − 1) + h1(n).
Table 4.3 summarizes performance of our solution when instantiated with diﬀerent
one-dimensional schemes. In the table, h1(n) and hd(n) denote the distance between
two nodes for one-dimensional and d-dimensional n-node graphs, respectively; and
f1(n) and fd(n) denote the space complexity (i.e., the number of edges) for one-
dimensional and d-dimensional graphs, respectively.69
Table 4.3
Performance of the d-dimensional scheme using various one-dimensional schemes.
One dimensional scheme d-dimensional scheme
h1(n) f1(n) hd(n) fd(n)
1 edge O(n2) 2d − 1 O(n2(logn)d−1)
2 edges O(nlogn) 2d O(n(logn)d)
3 edges O(nloglogn) 2d + 1 O(n(logn)d−1 loglogn)
4 edges O(nlog
∗ n) 2d + 2 O(n(logn)d−1 log
∗ n)
O(log
∗ n) edges O(n) 2(d − 1) + O(log
∗ n) O(n(logn)d−1)
Using the Data Structure
To permit eﬃcient key derivation, we also need a corresponding FindPath(v,w,G)
procedure that, given two points v and w in V , ﬁnds a shortest path of shortcut
edges from v to w. Here we give such a procedure, which can be viewed as a simple
generalization of the path-ﬁnding procedures of the one-dimensional case.
As before, we use RT to denote the recursion tree corresponding to the algorithm
that adds shortcuts to the graph; that is, in RT, the root corresponds to V , and the
root’s children correspond to the respective sets V1 and V2 that are separated by the
hyperplane M. We henceforth use Vu to denote the set of points that correspond to
a node u of RT, and V 0
u to denote the projection of Vu on the hyperplane Mu that
was used in the recursive call for u (of course, |V 0
u| = |Vu|, but V 0
u has one dimension
less than Vu). The height of RT is h = logn and its leaves correspond to sets of size
1 (as they correspond to the “bottom of the recursion”).
We augment every node u in RT with an array Πu that, for every point v of Vu,
gives its projection Πu(x) on the hyperplane Mu that was used in the recursive call
for u. This takes the same space as the number of shortcut edges that were added
at that particular node of RT and provides a constant-time mechanism for following
each such edge.70
Note that a point v ∈ V occurs in h sets like Vu once at each depth i in RT,
1 ≤ i ≤ h (the root being at the depth of 1). In what follows, for every point v ∈ V
and 1 ≤ i ≤ h, we use N(v,i) to denote the node u of RT at depth i and whose Vu
contains v. Note that N(v,1) is the root of RT, and that N(v,h) is the leaf of RT
that contains v.
Now we turn our attention to how RT is used to trace a short path between two
points. As we did for the one-dimensional case, here we make use of the fact that
in a tree it is easy to answer nearest common ancestor queries in constant time (i.e.,
given any two nodes of RT, their common ancestor in RT that is nearest to them,
can be computed in constant time).
The following procedure takes as inputs two d-dimensional points v,w ∈ V and, if
v dominates w, returns a shortest path from v to w. In what follows, G0
u denotes the
graph formed from the nodes of V 0
u (preserving the partial order relationship between
the nodes).
FindPath(x,y,G):
1. Check in constant time whether v dominates w. If not, then output “no path
exists” and stop; otherwise continue with the next step.
2. If the dimension of (v,w,G) is 1, then use a one-dimensional procedure for
ﬁnding the path. Otherwise, continue with the next step.
3. Let x = N(v,h) and y = N(w,h), i.e., x (resp., y) is the leaf of RT whose
corresponding set contains v (resp., w).
4. Compute in constant time the NCA in RT of x and y, call it u. Note that x
and y are both in Vu and they are on diﬀerent sides of the hyperplane Mu. Let
v0 = Πu(v) and w0 = Πu(w). The ﬁrst edge on the path we seek is (v,v0), the
last edge on it is (w0,w), and the portion of it from v0 to w0 is of dimension d−1
and can be computed as FindPath(v0,w0,G0
u).71
The time taken by this procedure is h1(n) for the base case, and constant per
dimension-reduction round, hence a total of O(d + h1(n)). The technique we used
in this FindPath algorithm is widely applicable to other recursive solutions built by
addition of shortcut edges: Its essence is that a nearest common ancestor computa-
tion provides a constant-time “jump” to the relevant spot in the recursion tree, after
which the problem becomes easy (we thereby avoid paying a price proportional to the
height of the recursion tree).72
5 TIME-BASED KEY ASSIGNMENT IN HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS
5.1 Problem Description
While the motivation for this chapter comes from the need to support access con-
trol policies with temporal constraints in user hierarchies, the problem does not need
to be limited to this particular setting. That is, an eﬃcient solution to the key man-
agement problem in temporal access control can ﬁnd use in other domains. Therefore,
we provide a very general formulation of the problem, without any assumptions on
the environment in which it is used. Of course, access control in user hierarchies
remains the most immediate and important application of our techniques. Thus, in
Section 5.4 we will show how our solution can be used to realize temporal access
control for user hierarchies.
Now let us assume that we are given a resource, and the owner of this resource
would like to control user access to that resource using time-based policies. For that
purpose, the lifetime of the system is partitioned into short time intervals (normally,
of a length of a day or shorter), and the access key for that resource changes every time
interval. Let m denote the number of time intervals in the system, T = {t1,...,tm}
denote the intervals, and K = {kt1,...,ktm} denote the corresponding access keys.
Now assume that a user U is authorized to access that resource during a contiguous
set of time intervals TU ⊆ T, where TU = {tstart,...,tend}. Following the notation
of [9], we use the interval-set over T, denoted by P, which is the set of all non-empty
contiguous subsequences of T, i.e., TU ∈ P for any TU. With such access rights,
U should receive or should be able to compute the keys KTU ⊆ K, where for each
t ∈ TU the key kt ∈ KTU. We denote the private information that U receives by
STU. Obviously, storing |TU| keys at the user end is not always practical (especially
if this number is large), and signiﬁcantly more eﬃcient solutions are possible. Then73
a time-based key assignment scheme assigns keys to the time intervals and users, so
that time-based access control is enforced in a correct and eﬃcient manner. Such
key generation is assumed to be performed by a central authority, but once a user is
issued the keys, there is no interaction with other entities. More formally, we deﬁne
a time-based KA scheme as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.1.1 Let T be a set of distinct time intervals and P be the interval-set
over T. A time-based key assignment scheme consists of algorithms (SetT, AssignT,
DeriveT) such that:
SetT is a probabilistic algorithm, which, on input a security parameter 1κ and the set
of time intervals T, outputs (i) a key kt for any t ∈ T; (ii) secret information Sec
associated with the system; and (iii) public information Pub. Let (K,Sec,Pub)
denote the output of this algorithm, where K is the set of all keys.
AssignT is a deterministic algorithm, which, on input a time sequence TU ∈ P and
secret information Sec, outputs private information STU for TU.
DeriveT is a deterministic algorithm, which, on input a time sequence TU, time inter-
val t ∈ TU, private information STU, and public information Pub, outputs the
key kt for time interval t.
The correctness requirement is such that, for each time sequence TU ∈ P, each
time interval t ∈ TU, each private information STU, each key kt ∈ K, and
each public information Pub that SetT(1κ,T) and AssignT(TU,Sec) can output,
Pr[DeriveT(TU,t,STU,Pub) = kt] = 1.
Note that in many cases the AssignT algorithm can be a part of the SetT algorithm,
i.e., private values STU for every TU ∈ P are generated at the system initialization
time. We, however, separate these algorithms to account for cases where retrieving
STU from Sec is not straightforward (which is the case in our scheme). In such cases,
merging these two algorithms together will needlessly complicate SetT resulting in
unnecessary overheads.74
As in hierarchical access control, we distinguish between two diﬀerent notions of
security for a time-based KA scheme: security against key recovery and security with
respect to key indistinguishability. A time-based KA scheme can also be secure against
static or adaptive adversaries. In [9], however, it was shown that the security of a time-
based hierarchical KA scheme against a static adversary is polynomial-time equivalent
to the security of that scheme against an adaptive adversary for both security goals
(key recovery and key indistinguishability). While in the current discussion we are
not concerned with hierarchical schemes, our setting can be considered to be a special
case of a hierarchy with a single class. Thus, in this work we only provide deﬁnitions
of a time-based KA scheme secure against a static adversary; and a proof of security
under such deﬁnitions will imply security against an adaptive adversary.
In our deﬁnition of a scheme secure against static adversary, let adversary Ast
attack the security of the scheme at time t ∈ T. Ast is then allowed to corrupt all
users who are not authorized to have access to kt and, when ﬁnished, is asked to guess
kt. We consider a scheme to be secure only if Ast has at most negligible probability in
outputting the correct key. More formally, we capture the adversary’s corrupt queries
using algorithm Corruptt(·) that takes the secret information Sec as input and outputs
a sequence of private information denoted by corr. The adversary then uses corr to
try to compute the key kt.
Deﬁnition 5.1.2 Let T be a set of distinct time intervals, P be the interval-set over
T, and KA = (SetT,AssignT,DeriveT) be a time-based KA scheme for P and a security
parameter κ. Then KA is secure against key recovery in the presence of a static
adversary if it satisﬁes the following properties:
• Completeness: A user, who is given private information STU for a sequence of
time intervals TU ∈ P, is able to compute the access key kt for each t ∈ TU
using only her knowledge of STU and public information Pub with probability 1.75
Experiment Exp
key−rec
KA,Ast (1κ)
(K,Sec,Pub) ← SetT(1κ,T)
corr ← Corruptt(Sec)
k ← Ast(1κ,Pub,corr)
if k = kt then return 1
else return 0
Experiment Exp
key−ind
KA,Ast (1κ)
(K,Sec,Pub) ← SetT(1κ,T)
corr ← Corruptt(Sec)
b
R ← {0,1}
if b = 0 then r
R ← {0,1}|kt|
b0 ← Ast(1κ,Pub,corr,r)
else b0 ← Ast(1κ,Pub,corr,kt)
if b = b0 then return 1
else return 0
Figure 5.1. Experiments in which a static adversary attacking a time-
based scheme participates.
• Soundness: Let Ast be a static adversary who attacks the scheme KA at time
interval t ∈ T. If we let the experiment Exp
key−rec
KA,Ast be speciﬁed as in Figure 5.1,
the advantage of Ast is deﬁned as:
Adv
key−rec
KA,Ast (1
κ) = Pr[Exp
key−rec
KA,Ast (1
κ) = 1]
We say that KA is sound with respect to key recovery if for each t ∈ T, for all
suﬃciently large κ, and every positive polynomial p(·), Adv
key−rec
KA,Ast (1κ) < 1/p(κ)
for each polynomial-time adversary Ast.
If now we consider schemes where keys are pseudo-random, the task of an adversary
is simply to distinguish between a real key and a random value instead of having
to recover the key. In this case, the deﬁnition of a secure time-based KA scheme is
similar to that of Deﬁnition 5.1.2, except the adversary is asked to participate in a
diﬀerent experiment:
Deﬁnition 5.1.3 Let T be a set of distinct time intervals, P be the interval-set over
T, and KA = (SetT,AssignT,DeriveT) be a time-based KA scheme for P and a security
parameter κ. Then KA is secure with respect to key indistinguishability against a static
adversary if it satisﬁes the following properties:76
• Completeness: A user, who is given private information STU for a sequence of
time intervals TU ∈ P, is able to compute the access key kt for each t ∈ TU
using only her knowledge of STU and public information Pub with probability 1.
• Soundness: Let Ast be a static adversary who attacks the scheme KA at a time
interval t ∈ T. If we let the experiment Exp
key−ind
KA,Ast be speciﬁed as in Figure 5.1,
then the advantage of Ast is deﬁned as:
Adv
key−ind
KA,Ast (1
κ) = Pr[Exp
key−ind
KA,Ast (1
κ) = 1]
We say that KA is sound with respect to key indistinguishability if for each t ∈ T,
for all suﬃciently large κ, and every positive polynomial p(·), Adv
key−ind
KA,Ast (1κ) <
1/p(κ) for each adversary Ast that runs in polynomial time.
In addition to the security requirements, an eﬃcient KA scheme is evaluated by the
following criteria:
• The size of the private information a user must store;
• The amount of computation necessary to generate an access key for the target
time interval;
• The amount of information the service provider must maintain for public access.
5.2 Building the Initial Scheme
All of our constructions are based on the notion of key derivation in a graph, and,
when we say that there is a directed edge from v to w in G, it implies that v is capable
of deriving w’s key using its own key. This means that, for the data structures that we
build (all of which are DAGs), there will be a public and secret information associated
with each node, and there will be public information corresponding to each edge.
Our preliminary data structure is rather simple and consists of two main steps:
building a grid of size m × m (where m is the number of time intervals in the sys-77
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Figure 5.2. Building the data structure for the initial time-based scheme.
tem) and applying one-dimensional shortcut techniques to parts of the grid. A more
detailed description follows.
SetT(1κ,T):
1. Build half of a grid of dimension m×m as shown in the left diagram of Figure 5.2.
We denote by v1,1 the root node; node vi,j is located at the row i and column
j. There is a directed edge from each vi,j to vi+1,j, and from each vi,j to vi,j+1.
Call such data structure G. The time interval ti corresponds to the node vi,m−i
in G.
2. Apply the hierarchical solution to G by executing Set(1κ,G). It should be clear
that in G, given a key for vi,j, all keys for time intervals in the range ti,...,tm−j+1
can be derived from it (in the worst-case O(m) time).
3. Apply a one-dimensional shortcut scheme S1 to each row and column of the
grid (see the right diagram in Figure 5.2). In more detail, add shortcuts to the
data structure to permit fast derivation of vi,x’s key from vi,y’s key for any x > y
(and similarly vx,j’s key from vy,j’s key for any x > y).
The above algorithm generates a data structure with O(space(S1(m))) shortcuts per
row or column and therefore O(m · space(S1(m))) total space.
Having this, the key assignment algorithm for a user entitled to have access to the
resource at time intervals TU = {tx,...,ty} ∈ P is straightforward:78
Table 5.1
Performance of the initial time-based scheme.
Underlying Private Key Public
scheme storage derivation storage
2HS 1 ≤ 4 op. O(m2logm)
3HS 1 ≤ 6 op. O(m2 loglogm)
4HS 1 ≤ 8 op. O(m2 log
∗ m)
log
∗HS 1 O(log
∗m) op. O(m2)
AssignT(TU,Sec): Return Svx,n−y+1.
Key derivation of the key corresponding to the current time interval ti ∈ TU now
consists of at most 2 · time(S1(m)) steps: at most time(S1(m)) steps are needed
to derive vi,m−y+1’s key from that of vx,m−y+1, and then at most time(S1(m)) steps
are needed to derive vi,m−i+1’s key (which corresponds to ti) from that of vi,m−y+1.
Table 5.1 summarizes the performance of this basic scheme, when used with various
one-dimensional solutions.
5.3 An Improved Scheme
Next, we describe a solution that exhibits improved performance compared to the
previous scheme. We start by presenting a new data structure and then provide other
algorithms and usage cases to result in a full-ﬂedged time-based KA scheme.
At a high level, to build a new data structure, we partition all time intervals into
coarse blocks of
√
m time intervals each. We then apply the initial scheme to these
blocks treating each of them as a single unit. If user access is to be granted to a large
sequence of time intervals that spans across boundaries of these blocks, we can use
this level of granularity to assign keys. If, on the other hand, the user sequence of time
intervals is contained within a block, we recursively apply this procedure to the time
intervals within each block to support time-based access control of ﬁner granularity.79
If the user sequence spans across diﬀerent blocks, but contains partial blocks at the
beginning and at the end of it, then we utilize the coarse blocks’ keys to cover the
whole blocks along with two new types of keys that will be introduced later.
5.3.1 Lowering the Size of the Data Structure
We now present our improved data structure. For the purposes of the current
presentation, we let m = 22q for some integer q. This allows us to avoid using rounding
notation bxc and dxe throughout the algorithms and results in a cleaner presentation,
but does not limit the applicability of our result. Our procedure for building the data
structure takes as inputs a node u and the set T, and then recursively builds a
tree for the set rooted at u. Due to the recursive nature of this function, we use
T w = {ta,...,tb} to denote the working set of the current function invocation and
|T w| to denote the size of T w. Then the data structure is constructed as follows:
DataStructBuild(u,T w):
1. If |T w| = 2 (i.e., q = 0), then return. Otherwise, continue with the next step.
2. Partition T w into
p
|T w| sets of
p
|T w| contiguous time intervals each and call
them T w
1 , ..., T w √
|Tw|. That is, if T w = {t1, ..., t|Tw|}, then T w
i = {t
i
√
|Tw|+1,
..., t
i
√
|Tw|+
√
|Tw|}. Create a node ui for each T w
i , and make ui a child of u.
3. Generate a problem Coarse(T w), derived from T w by treating each T w
i as a
single unit (i.e., “merging” the internals of T w
i into a single item). Note that
the size of set Coarse(T w) is
p
|T w|.
4. Store at node u an instance of the initial data structure for Coarse(T w), denoted
by D(u). D(v) can process time sequences that are the union of a contiguous
subset of blocks in Coarse(T w), but not time sequences with at least one end-
point inside the T w
i ’s.
5. Build a one-dimensional structure by creating an edge from ti to ti+1 for i =
a,...,b−1 and the reverse of this structure by creating an edge from ti+1 to ti.80
(c) State after Step 3.
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Figure 5.3. Construction of the data structure for the improved time-
based scheme (ﬁrst level of recursion).
Apply the shortcutting technique to the ﬁrst structure and the call the resulting
graph R(u). Similarly, apply the shortcutting technique to the second structure
and call the resulting graph L(u). The former will be used to support time
sequences that start at the right boundary of T w and end inside it (we call
this the right-anchored problem); and the latter will be used to support time
sequences that start at the left boundary of T w and end inside it (we call this
the left-anchored problem).
6. Recursively apply the algorithm to each child of T w; i.e., call DataStructBuild(ui,
T w
i ) in turn for each i = 1,...,
p
|T w|. Return the data structure rooted at u.
Figure 5.3 gives an illustration of how the data structure is built. D(u) supports per-
formance of 1 key, O(time(S1(|T w|))) key derivation, and O(space(S1(|T w|))) space.
Performance of R(u) and L(u) is 1 key, O(time(S1(|T w|))) steps per key derivation,
and O(space(S1(|T w|))) total space. The total space S(m) of the above data struc-
ture satisﬁes the recurrence S(m) ≤
√
mS(
√
m) + c1 · space(S1(m)) if m > 2 and
S(2) = c2, where c1 and c2 are constants. Thus, S(m) = O(space(S1(m))loglogm).
Now we can use the algorithm for building the data structure to setup a time-based
KA scheme:
SetT(1κ,T):
1. Execute DataStructBuild(root,T); call the data structure returned G.
2. Execute Set(1κ,G) using a hierarchical key assignment scheme.81
5.3.2 Key Assignment
We now turn our attention to showing which keys are given to a user who has
access to an arbitrary sequence of time intervals TU ∈ P. In what follows, u is a node
of the above tree data structure and T w is the set of time intervals associated with
u. The recursive procedure below, when invoked on any TU and our data structure,
returns a set of (at most 3) keys associated with TU.
AssignKeys(TU,G,u,T w):
1. If u is a leaf, then return a key for each of the (at most two) time intervals in
TU. Otherwise, continue with the next step.
2. Let u1,...,u√
|Tw| be the children of u, and let T w
1 ,...,T w √
|Tw| be the respective
sets of times associated with these children. We distinguish two cases:
(a) TU overlaps with only one set T w
i . Then we return the keys from the
recursive call AssignKeys(TU,G,ui,T w
i ).
(b) TU overlaps with all of T w
k ,...,T w
k+`, where ` ≥ 1. These ` + 1 intervals
are handled in 3 diﬀerent ways: Those completely contained in TU are
collectively processed using the D(u) structure, resulting in one key. If T w
k
overlaps with TU, but is not contained in TU, then it is right-anchored and
is processed using R(uk), resulting in one key. If T w
k+` overlaps with TU,
but is not contained in TU, then it is left-anchored and is processed using
L(uk+`), resulting in one key. Those (at most) 3 keys are returned.
Then the overall procedure for assigning a key to user simply calls the above recursive
algorithm:
AssignT(TU): Return AssignKeys(TU,G,root,T).
All keys given to users must be labeled with the level at which they were retrieved
in the data structure, i.e., the distance from the root node in the tree T. This
is necessary for achieving constant-time computation of access keys, which will be82
explained in the next section. To make key derivation simpler, we also label user keys
with their type; namely: D, R, or L. In addition, if a user receives more than a single
key for her time sequence TU, each key is labeled with a range of time intervals to
which it permits access.
To summarize, we assume that a key given to a user will be labeled with four
values (lev,type,ta,tb), where 0 ≤ lev ≤ loglogn, type ∈ {R,L,D}, and ta,tb ∈ T
such that ta < tb. For example, if a user with access rights to TU = {tstart,...,tend}
is given private information consisting of three keys STU = {k1,k2,k3}, then k1 could
be labeled with (l,R,tstart,ta), k2 with (l−1,D,ta+1,tb), and k3 with (l,L,tb+1,tend).
5.3.3 Content Distribution
At time t ∈ T, the service provider wants to make certain content (possibly very
voluminous) available to the users with access rights to time interval t. To do so, the
content is encrypted with the access key kt using a symmetric encryption scheme and
is made available to all users in the encrypted form (by placing it in a public location,
broadcasting it to the users, or by other means). In our scheme the server also needs
to ensure that the keys that users derive for t allow them to obtain kt. There are
O(loglogn) such keys for t in the data structure, access to which should allow access
to kt. Since the data structure has (loglogn + 1) levels, such keys are:
• Keys from R(v), for some v in the data structure T, one from each level.
• Keys from L(v), similarly, for a single v per level.
• Keys corresponding to D(v), one from each level l, where 0 ≤ l ≤ loglogn− 1.
We refer to these keys as enabling keys. The server places in the public domain
information that permits derivation of kt from any of the enabling keys above (by
computing a public information corresponding to an edge between an enabling key
and kt). Additionally, the server labels the public derivation information associated
with each of the enabling keys with the level and the type (i.e., R, L, or D) of the83
corresponding enabling key. This is needed to permit fast constant-time derivation
of the access key kt.
5.3.4 Key Derivation
A user U with access to the sequence of time intervals TU = {tstart,...,tend} ∈ P
receives private information STU consisting of 1, 2, or 3 keys that permit her to derive
enabling keys for each t ∈ TU. In the most general (and common) case, such private
information consists of 3 keys (denoted by k1, k2, and k3), which are labeled as
(l,R,tstart,ta), (l − 1,D,ta+1,tb), and (l,L,tb+1,tend), respectively, for some l, a, and
b. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that if the number of keys is less than 3,
then the missing keys are set to empty strings with key k1 remaining to be of type R,
key k2 of type D, and key k3 of type L. Then to obtain the enabling key for a time
interval ti ∈ TU, U executes a derivation algorithm which we sketch here:
DeriveKey(TU,ti,STU,Pub):
1. Parse STU as k1(l, R, tstart, ta), k2(l − 1, D, ta+1, tb), k3(l,L,tb+1,tend).
2. If ti ∈ {tstart,...,ta}, ﬁnd the node v at level l such that R(v) permits access
to ti (note that such node v can be computed in constant time using index i of
the time interval ti). Use k1 and the public information from Pub to derive the
key corresponding to ti and return that enabling key.
3. Similarly, if ti ∈ {tb+1,...,tend}, locate the node v at level l such that L(v)
permits access to ti. Use k3 and Pub to derive an enabling key for ti and return
that key.
4. Finally, if ti ∈ {ta+1,tb}, locate v at level l − 1 such that D(v) permits access
to ti; use k2 and Pub to derive an enabling key for ti and return it.
Key derivation complexity in all of the above cases is O(time(S1(n))).84
. . .
level 0
level 1
level 2
t14
v
v4 v3 v2 v1
v11 v12 v41 v42
t13 t15
D(v42), R(v42), L(v42)
D(v), R(v), L(v)
t3
D(v4), R(v4), L(v4)
t1 t4 t2 t16
Figure 5.4. Example illustration of the temporal data structure.
5.3.5 Example
To better illustrate how the above algorithms for building the data structure and
assigning and deriving keys work, we give a toy example. Let n = 16. Then the
DataStructBuild(root,T) procedure will result in a tree of depth three. Let us denote
the root of the tree by v, ith child of the root by vi, and jth child of node vi by vij.
Also, let Ti and Tij denote the set of time intervals that vi and vij cover, respectively.
For n = 16, such a tree is given in Figure 5.4. In the ﬁgure, each node w has data
structures D(w), R(w), and L(w) associated with it, which we omit for conciseness.
Now consider users U1, U2, and U3 with the following access rights: TU1 = {t1, ...,
t6}, TU2 = {t2, ..., t4}, and TU3 = {t4, ..., t14}. According to the key assignment
algorithm AssignKeys, they are assigned keys in the following way: Since U1’s sequence
of time intervals starts at the beginning of the system’s lifetime, U1’s credentials are
left-anchored at the level of v, and U1 obtains a single key from L(v) corresponding
to t6. Such a key permits derivation of the remaining enabling keys for t1 through t5.
User U2’s access rights are contained within the time interval covered by v1. Thus,
U2 obtains from D(v1) a key corresponding to T12 (covers t3 and t4). The remaining
part of TU2 is obtained from R(v11) (covers t2). Finally, for user U3, the access rights
cross the boundaries of nodes at the ﬁrst level, so we start at v. U3 obtains from D(v)
a key that permits generation of keys for T2 and T3 (their parent) and thus covers t5
through t12. To cover the remaining intervals, U3 is given the key corresponding to
t4 from R(v1) and a key from L(v4) corresponding to t14 (which permits derivation of
the key for t13 as well).85
Table 5.2
Performance of the improved time-based scheme.
Underlying Private Key Public
scheme storage derivation storage
2HS ≤ 3 ≤ 5 op. O(nlognloglogn)
3HS ≤ 3 ≤ 7 op. O(n(loglogn)2)
4HS ≤ 3 ≤ 9 op. O(nlog
∗ nloglogn)
log
∗HS ≤ 3 O(log
∗ n) op. O(nloglogn)
To illustrate content distribution and key derivation, let t4 be the current time
interval. Our data structure contains 8 enabling keys for t4 of level-type (0,R),
(1,R), (2,R), (0,L), (1,L), (2,L), (0,D), and (1,D). The service provider places in
the public domain derivation information that, given any of the keys above, permits
computation of the access key kt4. U1 then uses its only key and L(v) to derive the
enabling key for t4 and derives kt4 by using public information marked with (0,L). U2
uses its key for T12 compute its enabling key and obtain kt4 using public information
marked with (1,D). Finally, U3 uses its key for t4 and public information with label
(1,R) to obtain kt4.
5.3.6 Putting Everything Together
In this section we summarize our construction and show its performance. Fig-
ure 5.5 gives a complete description of our time-based KA scheme using the basic
scheme of Chapter 3 as the key derivation mechanism. Table 5.2 summarizes per-
formance of our solution. The security of our solution comes from the way key
assignment and derivation are performed in a DAG and is not due to the details of
the data structures built.86
Algorithm SetT(1κ,T):
1. Create a root node root for the data structure and run DataStuctBuild(root,T).
Let G = (V , E) denote the tree structure returned.
2. For each v ∈ V , randomly choose a secret key kw ∈ {0,1}κ and a unique public
label `w ∈ {0,1}κ associated with each node w in D(v), R(v), and L(v).
3. For each v ∈ V , construct public information about each edge in D(v), R(v),
and L(v) using the key derivation method. That is, for each edge (w,u), its
public value is yw,u ∈ {0,1}κ.
4. For each t ∈ T, randomly choose a secret key kt ∈ {0,1}κ and a unique public
label `t ∈ {0,1}κ.
5. For each t ∈ T, let Vt ⊂ V denote the set of nodes in G access to which implies
access to t. Then for each Vt, for each v ∈ Vt:
(a) ﬁnd in D(v) the node corresponding to the time interval t; call it w.
(b) create an edge from w to t by computing public information using en-
abling key kw, t’s secret key kt, public label `t, and the key derivation
method. Mark such an edge with the level of v and type D.
(c) repeat (a) and (b) for R(v) and L(v), using types R and L, respectively.
6. Let K consist of the secret keys kt for each t ∈ T and Sec consist of the
remaining secret keys kw. Also let Pub consist of G, all public labels (of the
form `w and `t), and public information about all edges generated above.
Algorithm AssignT(TU,Sec):
1. Execute AssignKeys(TU,root,T), where root is the root node of G.
2. Set STU to the keys computed and return STU.
Algorithm DeriveT(TU,t,STU,Pub):
1. If t 6∈ TU, return a special rejection symbol ⊥.
2. Execute DeriveKey(TU,t,STU,Pub) to compute an enabling key for t; call it k0
t.
3. Use k0
t along with its (level-type) label and Pub to derive key kt.
Figure 5.5. Description of proposed time-based key assignment scheme.87
Theorem 5.3.1 Assuming the security of the family of PRFs F κ, the time-based key
assignment scheme given in Figure 5.5 is both complete and sound with respect to key
recovery in the presence of a static adversary.
Proof Our proof uses a standard hybrid argument. Per Deﬁnition 5.1.2, we are
dealing with adversary Ast who participates in the experiment Exp
key−rec
KA,Ast for time
interval t ∈ T. We construct a sequence of experiments Exp
0
KA,Ast,...,Exp
q
KA,Ast, in
which we modify the way the scheme is constructed while ensuring that the distribu-
tions of Ast’s views remain indistinguishable in any two consecutive experiments. Our
modiﬁcation consists of replacing, in the public data structure corresponding to KA,
one (pseudo-random) output produced by the function F κ with a random sequence.
Formally, Exp
i
KA,Ast for any i = 0,...,q is:
Experiment Exp
i
KA,Ast(1κ)
(K,Sec,Pub
0) ← Set
i
T(1κ,T)
corr ← Corruptt(Sec)
k ← Ast(1κ,Pub
0,corr)
if k = kt then return 1
else return 0
Here the algorithm Set
0
T corresponds to the original algorithm SetT, while Set
i+1
T is
constructed from Set
i
T by replacing one edge in the data structure with a random
string. The edges that we replace are those that were constructed using kt or any
other key material that can lead to derivation of kt. More precisely, for each level l
in the data structure G, there is a unique v ∈ G that covers t. For each such v, we
replace the edges:
1. In D(v), let w denote the leaf node that covers t. Then replace each edge on
the path between any two nodes in Anc(w,G) and replace each outgoing edge
from every node in Anc(w,G).
2. In R(v) and L(v), replace each edge on the path from the root to the node
corresponding to t (call it w) and the edge from w.88
The edges are replaced in the top-down fashion to completely exclude from the data
structure information about each key on the way from the root to the node corre-
sponding to time interval t.
Additionally, we replace edges from each of the O(loglogn) enabling keys, which
correspond to t in G, to kt. Thus, Exp
0
KA,Ast corresponds to the case where Ast
operates on the data structure of experiment Exp
key−rec
KA,Ast , while Exp
q
KA,Ast corresponds
to the case where Ast operates on the data structure with no information related
to kt. Since all of the keys (including kt) are chosen at random, Ast has at most
negligible probability in succeeding in Exp
q
KA,Ast. The total number of edges replaced
is O(space(S1(n)loglogn)) and thus is polynomial in the security parameter κ.
Using a standard reduction argument, we can show that any non-negligible dif-
ference in behavior between experiments Exp
i
KA,Ast and Exp
i+1
KA,Ast can be used to
construct an algorithm that BF is able to break the pseudo-random function F with
non-negligible advantage. Thus, we conclude that Ast has at most negligible advan-
tage in breaking the security of the scheme. ￿
To achieve a stronger notion of key indistinguishability, all is needed is to use a
diﬀerent key assignment and derivation method that achieves this property, i.e., the
extended scheme of Chapter 3. Then we use this enhanced key derivation mechanism
in Step 3 of the SetT algorithm of Figure 5.5 (i.e., in data structures D(v), R(v), and
L(v)). This means that now someone with access to a certain key in, for instance, R(v)
and who guesses an unauthorized key correctly, cannot use the public information for
that data structure to test the key. This change implies the corresponding change in
the Derive algorithm.
Theorem 5.3.2 Assuming the security of the family of PRFs F κ and the security of
the encryption scheme E, our time-based key assignment scheme that uses the extended
key assignment scheme of Section 3.3 is both complete and sound with respect to key
indistinguishability in the presence of a static adversary.89
Proof The proof is straightforward using the hybrid argument and the proof tech-
niques of Theorems 3.3.1 and 5.3.1. ￿
In Section 5.7 we show how the lifetime of the system can be extended to new intervals
beyond the original m. Also, in the same section we show how one can further
decrease public storage space at a slight increase in the number of user keys (i.e., a
generalization in terms of keys/space tradeoﬀ).
5.4 Temporal Access Control for a User Hierarchy
Recall that in systems with hierarchically organized access classes, such a hierarchy
is normally modeled as a directed acyclic access graph which we denote by GU. As
before, we assume that each node corresponds to an access class and the edges form a
partial order relationship between the classes, where an edge from node v to node w
means that the parent node v inherits privileges of the node w. Thus, we can assign
each class a single secret key and let users obtain keys of their descendant classes
through a key derivation process described in Chapter 3.
Now if we equip the model with time-based policies, in addition to computing
keys of descendant classes, a user should be able to compute keys based on time.
That is, a user U entitled to access class v ∈ VU during a sequence of time intervals
TU ∈ P obtains private information that permits her to compute keys kv,t for her
access class v and each t ∈ TU (time-based key derivation). In addition, the private
information allows U to compute, for each t ∈ TU, keys kw,t for each descendant
access class w in the user hierarchy (class-based key derivation). Thus, key derivation
now consists of two dimensions, which can potentially be performed using drastically
diﬀerent techniques.
A deﬁnition of a hierarchical time-based KA scheme can be constructed by ex-
tending Deﬁnition 5.1.1 with user hierarchies.
Deﬁnition 5.4.1 Let T be a set of distinct time intervals, P be the interval-set over
T, and GU = (VU,EU) be a DAG corresponding to a hierarchy of classes. A hierarchi-90
cal time-based key assignment scheme consists of algorithms (SetT,AssignT,DeriveT)
such that:
SetT is a probabilistic algorithm, which, on input a security parameter 1κ, the set of
time intervals T, and the hierarchy GU, outputs (i) a key kv,t for any v ∈ VU and
t ∈ T; (ii) secret information Sec associated with the system; and (iii) public
information Pub. Let the output of this algorithm be denoted by (K,Sec,Pub),
where K is the set of all keys.
AssignT is a deterministic algorithm, which, on input a time sequence TU ∈ P, class
v ∈ VU, and secret information Sec, outputs private information Sv,TU.
DeriveT is a deterministic algorithm, which, on input a time sequence TU, time inter-
val t ∈ TU, access class v ∈ VU, private information Sv,TU, target class u ∈ VU,
and public information Pub, outputs the key ku,t corresponding to class u at
time interval t.
The correctness requirement is such that, for each class v ∈ VU, each tar-
get class u ∈ Desc(v,GU), each time sequence TU ∈ P, each time interval
t ∈ TU, each private information Sv,TU, each key ku,t ∈ K, and each pub-
lic information Pub that SetT(1κ,T,GU) and AssignT(TU,v,Sec) can output,
DeriveT(TU,t,v,Sv,TU,u,Pub) = ku,t.
The deﬁnition of a secure time-based KA scheme must also be slightly modiﬁed for this
setting to take into account diﬀerent access classes. Recall from Section 5.1 that we do
need to consider active adversaries, and now have a static adversary Ast who attacks a
class v ∈ VU at time t ∈ T. Ast is allowed to obtain access to the secret information of
all classes w ∈ VU at all times t0 ∈ T, except classes Anc(v) at time t. This is modeled
by an algorithm Corruptv,t, which now is class-based. We say that a hierarchical key
assignment scheme is secure if such Ast has at most negligible probability of guessing
kv,t correctly (distinguishing it from a random string) in case of security against key
recovery (resp, in case of security with respect to key indistinguishability). The rest91
Experiment Exp
key−rec−h
KA,Ast (1κ)
(K,Sec,Pub) ← SetT(1κ,GU,T)
corr ← Corruptv,t(Sec)
k ← Ast(1κ,Pub,corr)
if k = kv,t then return 1
else return 0
Experiment Exp
key−ind−h
KA,Ast (1κ)
(K,Sec,Pub) ← SetT(1κ,GU,T)
corr ← Corruptv,t(Sec)
b
R ← {0,1}
if b = 0 then r
R ← {0,1}|kv,t|
b0 ← Ast(1κ,Pub,corr,r)
else b0 ← Ast(1κ,Pub,corr,kv,t)
if b = b0 then return 1
else return 0
Figure 5.6. Experiments in which a static adversary attacking a hier-
archical time-based scheme participates.
of the security deﬁnitions for key recovery and key indistinguishability mimic our
previous deﬁnitions without a hierarchy of classes.
Deﬁnition 5.4.2 Let GU = (VU,EU) be a DAG corresponding to a hierarchy, T be a
set of distinct time intervals, P be the interval-set over T, and KA = (SetT, AssignT,
DeriveT) be a time-based hierarchical KA scheme for GU, P, and a security parameter
κ. Then KA is secure against key recovery in the presence of a static adversary if it
satisﬁes the following properties:
• Completeness: A user, who is given private information Sv,TU for a sequence of
time intervals TU ∈ P and a class v ∈ VU, is able to compute with probability
1 the access key kw,t for each t ∈ TU and w ∈ Desc(v,GU) using only her
knowledge of Sv,TU and public information Pub.
• Soundness: Let Ast be a static adversary who attacks the class v at time interval
t ∈ T. If we let the experiment Exp
key−rec−h
KA,Ast be speciﬁed as in Figure 5.6, the
advantage of Ast is deﬁned as:
Adv
key−rec−h
KA,Ast (1
κ) = Pr[Exp
key−rec−h
KA,Ast (1
κ) = 1]92
We say that KA is sound with respect to key recovery if for each t ∈ T, for
each v ∈ V , for all suﬃciently large κ, and every positive polynomial p(·),
Adv
key−rec−h
KA,Ast (1κ) < 1/p(κ) for each adversary Ast that runs in polynomial time.
The deﬁnition of a hierarchical time-based key assignment scheme secure with respect
to key indistinguishability is the same as the deﬁnition above with the exception that
the adversary now participates in the experiment Exp
key−rec−h
KA,Ast given in Figure 5.6.
We can create a hierarchical time-based KA scheme by applying our solution
independently to each access class in the user hierarchy. Then for each t ∈ T, the
nodes with keys kv,t for each v ∈ VU are connected with edges to form the original
hierarchy of classes. In more detail, for each v ∈ VU we use the improved scheme to
build the data structure for T and generate access keys kv,t for every t ∈ T. This
will result in |VU| instances of the time-based graph G, each of which permits key
derivation for a speciﬁc access class. Since the structure of such graphs is the same for
all of them, but the keys assigned to nodes and keys encoded in the public information
will diﬀer, we denote the public information generated for access class v according to G
as Pub
G
v . Then for any t ∈ T, the public information for GU is constructed according
to the current keys for each access class using the key derivation method of the base
scheme in Chapter 3. We denote the public information at time interval t generated
according to GU by Pub
GU
t . For a user with access privileges for time interval TU ∈ P
at access level v ∈ VU consists of time-based key derivation (using Pub
G
v ) of the key kv,t
followed by class-based key derivation of the key kw,t (using Pub
GU
t ); this is assuming
that t ∈ TU and w ∈ Desc(v,GU). A more precise description of our scheme is given
in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.
In the SetT algorithm, we ﬁrst build the data structure G and generate public
labels for the time intervals (Steps 1–3). Then for each class u in the user hierarchy,
we select secret keys for its copy of G and generate public information according to
those keys (Step 5). Next, we connect the data structures corresponding to diﬀerent
user classes according to the partial order relationship between those classes (Step
6). That is, for each time interval t, if user class u1 is a parent of user class u2, we93
Algorithm SetT(1κ,T,GU):
1. Create a root node root for the data structure and run DataStuctBuild(root,T).
Let G = (V,E) denote the tree structure returned.
2. For each v ∈ V , choose a unique public label `w ∈ {0,1}κ for every node w in
D(v), R(v), and L(v).
3. For each t ∈ T, choose a unique public label `t ∈ {0,1}κ.
4. For each u ∈ VU, choose a unique public label `u ∈ {0,1}κ.
5. For each node u ∈ VU, perform the following:
(a) For each v ∈ V , randomly choose a secret key ku,w ∈ {0,1}κ associated
with each node w in D(v), R(v), and L(v).
(b) For each v ∈ V , construct public information about each edge in D(v),
R(v), and L(v) using the key derivation method.
(c) For each t ∈ T, randomly choose a secret key ku,t ∈ {0,1}κ.
6. For each t ∈ T, compute public information to permit key derivation between
classes: for each edge (u1,u2) ∈ EU compute public information by setting
Su1 = ku1,t and Su2 = ku2,t and using the key derivation method and public
labels `u1 and `u2.
7. For each t ∈ T, let Vt ⊂ V denote the set of nodes in G access to which implies
access to t. Then for each Vt, for each v ∈ Vt:
(a) Find in D(v) the node corresponding to the time interval t; call it w.
(b) For each u ∈ VU, compute public information to permit derivation of t’s
access key from w’s enabling key ku,w using the key derivation method
and public label `t. Mark such an edge with the level of v and type D.
(c) repeat (a) and (b) for R(v) and L(v), using types R and L, respectively.
8. Let K consist of the secret keys ku,t for each t ∈ T and u ∈ VU, and let Sec
consist of the remaining secret keys ku,w. Let Pub consist of G, all public
labels, and public information about all edges generated above.
Figure 5.7. Description of proposed time-based hierarchical key assignment scheme.94
Algorithm AssignT(u,TU,Sec):
1. Execute AssignKeys(TU,root,T) using the data structure stored in Pub
G
u, where
root is the root node of G.
2. Set Su,TU to the keys computed and return Su,TU.
Algorithm DeriveT(u1,u2,TU,t,Sv,TU,Pub):
1. If t 6∈ TU or u2 6∈ Desc(u1,G), return ⊥.
2. Execute DeriveKey(TU,t,Su1,TU,Pub
G
u1) to compute an enabling key for t, k0
u1,t.
3. Use k0
u1,t along with its (level-type) label and Pub
G
u1 to derive key ku1,t.
4. Use ku1,t and Pub
GU
t to derive ku2,t using the key derivation method.
Figure 5.8. Description of proposed time-based hierarchical key as-
signment scheme (continued).
compute public information that permits derivation of ku2,t from ku1,t. Finally, Step
7 is similar to Step 5 in Figure 5.5 and allows computation of t’s access keys from an
enabling key corresponding to t at any level of granularity in the data structure G.
The fact that keys for an access class are assigned independently of the keys for
other access classes allows us to state the following result:
Theorem 5.4.1 Assuming the security of the family of pseudo-random functions F κ,
the time-based key assignment scheme for hierarchically organized access classes given
in Figure 5.7 is both complete and sound with respect to key recovery in the presence
of a static adversary.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.3.1, in this case we also use a hybrid argu-
ment and construct a sequence of experiments Exp
0
KA,Ast,...,Exp
q
KA,Ast for adversary
Ast who attacks the scheme at class v during time interval t, deﬁned as follows:95
Experiment Exp
i
KA,Ast(1κ)
(K,Sec,Pub
0) ← Set
i
T(1κ,GU,T)
corr ← Corruptv,t(Sec)
k ← Ast(1κ,Pub
0,corr)
if k = kv,t then return 1
else return 0
In the experiments, Set
0 corresponds to the original algorithm Set, and Set
i+1 is
constructed from Set
i by replacing public information about a single edge in the data
structure by a random string. The edges replaced are:
1. For each access class u ∈ Anc(v,GU), replace in Pub
G
u all of the edges that were
replaced in Pub for a single resource in the proof of Theorem 5.3.1 (in D(w),
R(w), and L(w) for all w of interest and in the top-down fashion).
2. Replace in Pub
GU
t , starting at the root1, information about edges (u,w) ∈ EU
for each u ∈ Anc(v).
Thus, Exp
0
KA,Ast is the same as Exp
key−rec−h
KA,Ast , while Exp
q
KA,Ast has no information
related to kv,t at the level of v or any of its ancestors. This means that Ast has at
most negligible probability in succeeding in Exp
q
KA,Ast.
Since the number of edges replaced is clearly polynomial in the security parameter,
we can use a standard reduction argument to show that any non-negligible advantage
between any Exp
i
KA,Ast and Exp
i+1
KA,Ast can be used to break the security of pseudo-
random functions. Since by our assumptions the PRF is secure, the scheme is secure
as well. ￿
To achieve key indistinguishability in this scheme, as before, we need to utilize the
extended key derivation method that prevents key testing. In this case we need to
use this method within the data structure G itself (in Step 5b of SetT) to prevent a
member of class u from testing keys of unauthorized time intervals. We also need to
1If several roots exist in GU, sort the nodes using any topological ordering.96
use this key derivation method between user classes (in Step 6 of SetT) to prevent a
member of class u from testing keys of its ancestor classes.
5.5 Practical Considerations
As was mentioned earlier, the goal of the solutions of this chapter is eﬃciency
under the assumption that the number of unit intervals m in the system is large. In
systems when this is not the case, other, simpler solutions will suﬃce (e.g., a simple
binary tree built on top of m intervals), and it is common sense to assume that a
suitable for the context solution will be chosen. We, however, believe that our solution
will ﬁnd its uses in a number of domains such as, for instance, access to historical
data. And even in applications where access is based on the current time, the service
provider will be free to choose the level of granularity for time-based access rights.
For broadcast-based services, there is no overhead in changing keys often.
Another consideration is that, in subscription-based services where access is based
on current time, dues might be paid in installments. That is, a user subscribes only to
a rather short sequence of intervals and renews her subscription on a periodic basis.
But even such systems might be setup for a long time in the future, and the service
provider will choose a solution that minimizes system and user resources.
5.6 Comparison with Existing Solutions
Table 5.3 compares performance of our scheme with other existing solutions; only
security against recovery was considered. In the table, diam(GU) denotes the diameter
of the graph (i.e., maximum distance between nodes) that bounds the number of
operations which, given a class key, are necessary to derive the key of the target
descendant class within the user hierarchy. Also, |EU| denotes the number of edges
in a user hierarchy GU. The table does not list private storage at the server since it
is equivalent for all solutions. Before proceeding with comparing existing results, we
brieﬂy explain what these parameters mean.9
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Table 5.3
Comparison of time-based hierarchical KA schemes.
Public Private Key Operation Complexity
Scheme information information derivation type assumption
Encryption- O(|VU|2|T|3) 1 1 decryption one-way
based [9] functions
Pairing-based [9] O(|VU|2) O(|T|) 1 pairing Bilinear Diﬃe-
evaluation Hellman
Binary tree O(|EU||T|) O(log|T|) O(log|T|+ PRF one-way
diam(GU)) functions
ISPIT+(3,1)-CSBT O(|EU||T| + |VU||T|× ≤ 3 O(diam(GU)) decryption IND-P1-CO
+EBC [65] log|T|(loglog|T|)2) encryption [98]
Our 4HS-based O(|EU||T| + |VU||T|× ≤ 3 O(diam(GU)) PRF one-way
log
∗ nloglog|T|) functions
ISPIT+(3,1)-CSBT O(|EU||T| + |VU||T|× ≤ 3 O(log
∗ |T|+ decryption IND-P1-CO
+EBC [65] log|T|loglog|T|) diam(GU)) encryption [98]
Our log
∗HS-based O(|EU||T| + |VU||T|× ≤ 3 O(log
∗ |T|+ PRF one-way
loglog|T|) diam(GU)) functions98
In the great majority of cases, the depth of user hierarchies is a small constant,
resulting in diam(GU) being a small constant as well. In cases where the depth of
the original graph GU is fairly large and it is unacceptable to have the user perform
diam(GU) operations, we can insert shortcut edges either at random (if diam(GU) =
O(VU)) or using the techniques of Chapter 4 that reduce the diameter of the hierarchy
to a small constant at the expense of small increase in the public storage.2 Thus, in
this case diam(GU) is also a small constant, and parameter |EU| will need to be
replaced with a slightly larger value.
We also would like to mention that the schemes of [63] and [64] are not listed in
the table. These solutions allow a user to obtain access to an arbitrary subsequence
of time intervals (i.e., not restricted to contiguous sequences considered in all other
schemes), but require far slower key derivation of O(|VU|·|T|) modulo exponentiations.
Considering that small private user storage and fast key derivation, followed by
reasonable server storage are the main evaluation criteria, we can analyze the solutions
as follows. The Pairing-based scheme of [9] will have the slowest key derivation time
among all of the schemes listed here, as it uses pairing evaluation rather than fast
encryption or PRF operations. Additionally, the number of secret keys a user has to
maintain is large.
Compared to the Encryption-based scheme of [9], our key derivation time is higher
by a constant factor, private storage is similar (i.e., three keys instead of one), but
the amount of public information the server must maintain is much lower than in that
scheme. That is, for modest values of |T| = 1000 and |VU| = 10, the encryption-based
schemes requires storing on the order of 1011 labels, while in our case it will be bound
by the order of 106 labels.
While the simple binary-tree approach has asymptotically higher performance,
for small values of |T| it will be preferred due to its simplicity. However, for the
2It should be noted that the shortcutting techniques of Chapter 4 may fail on hierarchies the dimen-
sion of which is hard to approximate, but we believe that such cases are very rare for the applications
we consider in this work.99
applications we envision, other solutions exhibit better performance. Thus, our rec-
ommendation is to use the simplest approach suitable for a particular setup.
The work of De Santis et al. [65] lists solutions with diﬀerent performance pa-
rameters, and we include in the table only selected two schemes. That is, we chose
two schemes that require a user to store 3 private keys (just like in our solutions)
and where time-based key derivation involves O(1) and O(log
∗ n) decryptions, re-
spectively. This allows us to directly compare the schemes of [65] with our schemes.
As can be seen from the table, the solutions exhibit very similar performance, with
CSBT-based constructions having an additional factor of log|T| in the public storage
space.
To summarize, our solution oﬀers very attractive characteristics and superior per-
formance compared to other existing solutions: each user in the system receives a
small (≤ 3) number of keys, (oﬀ-line) computation of any access key involves a small
number of very eﬃcient operations, and the public storage required by our solution is
only slightly higher than the number of access keys that the system must maintain.
It is a very balanced solution in terms of its performance.
5.7 Extensions
5.7.1 Extending the Lifetime of the System
So far in all of our discussion we considered the lifetime of the system to consist of
a ﬁxed set of time intervals {t1,...,tm}. In many applications, however, there might
eventually be a need to support time intervals beyond the original m intervals. In
this section, we describe techniques for extending the number of time intervals.
One simple approach is to apply the techniques of Section 5.3 to a second set of
intervals. The interesting case is when a user’s access rights span across the boundary
(i.e., tn and tn+1), and this case results in two sets of keys being issued to that user.
This is particular appealing in applications where users purchase a subscription for a
period of time (e.g., they can view a collection of media objects on a speciﬁc day or100
month), after expiration of which there is no need to maintain keys for that period.
However, this approach is less desirable in applications where objects are assigned a
date (e.g., a user requests access to all movies released in 1977), because previous
intervals need to be maintained even after they have elapsed.
Suppose that the keys for previous time intervals need to be maintained. One
approach is to extend the time intervals, rebuild the data structure, and recompute
the public information. The downside of this approach is that all of the public in-
formation has to be recomputed (previous shortcuts may no longer be necessary and
other shortcuts may need to be added), but if extensions to the time intervals are
rare (which we assume is the case almost all of the time), then this may be accept-
able. If recomputing all of the public information is unacceptable, then in some cases
we can reuse the previous information. The simplest technique to achieve this is
to set the new number of time intervals to m2 (recall that building the tree data
structure involves partitioning the time intervals into chunks of size of square-root
of their number). Unfortunately, squaring the number of intervals is prohibitively
expensive, but if we assume that m is a power of 2 and is a perfect square, then we
can achieve full reuse of the previous information by doubling the length of a time
interval. The basic idea of this approach is that, in the data structure for m2 intervals,
the subset of the data structure that eﬀects the ﬁrst 2cm (c < logm) intervals has
size O(space(S1(2cm))loglog(2cm)). Thus, we can use this subset for the intervals,
and when we need to add more intervals we can simply add the new information from
the data structure for m2 intervals.
In more detail, the part of the data structure for m2 intervals that corresponds to
the ﬁrst 2cm time intervals has the following characteristics. The depth of recursion is
loglogm+1, and at the ﬁrst level of recursion the time intervals are partitioned into
blocks of size m. Since we already established bounds for systems with m intervals,
here we need to evaluate performance at the highest level of recursion. When we build
the data structure D(root) for 2c coarse units, it will result in O(2c · space(S1(2c)))
space. This space is dominated by the space required for data structures L(root)101
and R(root), both of which introduce O(space(S1(2cm))) shortcut edges. The space
needed for the scheme at all other levels of recursion is the sum of space for each
m-interval block: O(2c · space(S1(m))loglogm). Thus, the total space for the data
structure does not exceed O(space(S1(2cm))loglog(2cm)).
The bounds of the key assignment and derivation algorithms are not aﬀected by
this increase, because we are only adding one additional level of recursion to the data
structure, and time key derivation time at all levels of recursion is equivalent.
5.7.2 Handling Changes to the Hierarchy
In a number of applications, there might be situations where the user hierarchy
needs to be changed after the keys have been distributed to users. For example,
suppose that in a subscription-based service users are given privileges for one year
(and thus can compute keys for up to a year in the future). Now suppose that some
time later the service provider decides to add a new subscription class or to remove
a subscription class (and re-assign the clients to other classes). In this section, we
discuss techniques for making such changes to the hierarchy.
Before we proceed with outlining how such changes can be performed, recall from
Chapter 3 that removal of access rights (such as edge and node deletions, as well as
user revocation) will be transparent to the users only if the extended key assignment
scheme is used.
Adding nodes. To add a node v to the access graph for time intervals ti,...,tj,
we choose keys kv,ti,...,kv,tj and compute the public information Pub
G
v for these time
intervals according to the keys. Then using the procedure for adding nodes from
Section 3.4, the access node v is added to the hierarchy at times ti,...,tj including
the necessary information to Pub
GU
ti ,...,Pub
GU
tj .
Adding edges. To add an edge from v to w for time intervals ti,...,tj, the necessary
information is added to Pub
GU
ti ,...,Pub
GU
tj as described in Section 3.4.102
Changing an access class’s key. To change a speciﬁc access level v’s key at a
speciﬁc time ti, the procedure of Section 3.4 is used to change the hierarchy key at
time ti. Then we update Pub
Gu
v and Pub
GU
ti accordingly. Note that this can be done
without re-keying any users.
Removing an edge. To remove an edge (u,v) at a speciﬁc time, the edge is removed
and the keys of all descendants of u are changed according to the previous algorithm.
Note that no user needs to be re-keyed.
Removing a node. To remove a node u at a speciﬁc time, all edges that point to u or
originate from u are removed. Then u’s vertex information at that time is forgotten.
If u is removed for all time intervals, then its temporal keys can be forgotten as well.
So far this discussion has focused on changes to the access hierarchy. However, changes
to user permissions are more likely than changes to hierarchy. For example, the system
may want to add new users, or remove a user (e.g., that has stopped paying), or to
change a user’s access level. To avoid having to re-key users other than the speciﬁc
user, we use ideas from Section 3.4 for handling user-level changes. Speciﬁcally, users
are not given direct access to keys, but rather each user is given her own key. Such
key is then used to generate the system keys which is achieved by encrypting the
keys that the user should obtain with the user’s key or adding public information
that permits derivation of the appropriate key using user’s key. This increases the
required public storage by an additive factor linear in the number of users (which the
server provides already maintains), but this prevents unnecessary re-keying.
Adding a user. To add a user, the user’s keys are generated and then the temporal
keys that are to be given to the user are encrypted with that user’s keys and this
information is added to the public storage.
Removing a user. To remove a user, the system needs to remove access to previous
material (to prevent the ex-member problem). And thus every key that the user could
derive must be changed and the public information must be updated so that other103
users can derive the updated information. This is a relatively expensive operation,
and thus should be done infrequently or in batches.
Changing a user. To change the access class of a user or the time at which a user
can access material, the system simply needs to remove the user and then add the
user with new rights. Note that in some special cases this can be done more eﬃciently.
For example, if the user’s rights are being escalated (i.e., the new rights of the user
are a superset of its current rights) then there is no need to remove the user or change
any system keys (as the ex-member problem is irrelevant).
5.7.3 Faster Key Assignment
In situations where very fast key assignment to users is important, we can modify
the AssignKeys algorithm of Section 5.3.2 to result in constant-time performance.
To be able to achieve this, we store the recursion tree (call it RT) of the AssignKeys
algorithm and use it to speed up the key assignment process. The time-consuming
part of this algorithm is the step-by-step descent from the root until the node u of RT
at which the desired keys reside. Thus, the keys we seek would be easy to assign in
constant time if we could go directly to that node u. This, however, is easy to do once
we observe that (i) the parent of u in RT is the lowest node whose interval contains
TU (i.e., u is the nearest common ancestor in RT of the two leaves that correspond
to the endpoints of I), and (ii) in any tree it is possible to answer nearest common
ancestor (NCA) queries in constant time (see [92] for details). Thus, we augment the
recursion tree with the information needed to answer such NCA queries in constant
time and during the key assignment process after ﬁnding the right node u in RT we
locally retrieve keys for the user time sequence TU.104
6 KEY ASSIGNMENT IN GEO-SPATIAL SYSTEMS
The focus of this chapter is extending key management techniques to support user
access rights in the geo-spatial domain. In particular, we assume we are given a large
area which is partitioned into small cells, and a user obtains access to a sub-area
on that grid. As before, we attempt to minimize the resources used at both the
user and the server, and smart resource utilization becomes possible by appropriately
exploiting the grid-based structure of the space.
6.1 Problem Description
The space consists of N cells in an n1 × n2 grid, N = n1n2; let us refer to the
grid as S. Without loss of generality, we assume that n1 ≥ n2 and that the grid
has n1 rows and n2 columns. A user is permitted to obtain access to any speciﬁc
sub-area within the grid. In general, user rights might permit access to areas of
arbitrary shape (subject to the cell partitioning), which can be represented as a set
of rectangles. Since the number of such rectangles in user access rights will be small
in most applications, we will assume, for simplicity, that the user is given access to a
single rectangular area R.
Then a grid cell will have an access key that permits access to the resources
associated with that cell. This means that during the system initialization the grid
cells will be assigned certain keys. Note that it will not always be the case that each
cell has a unique key, because in some systems access to certain cells will always be
granted in an all or none fashion (i.e., if a user is allowed to access one cell in the
group, then that user can access all cells in the group), in which case such cells can
share the same key.105
When a user joins the system and obtains access to an area R, she will be given a
key (or a set of keys) that permits access to every single cell within the area (through
a key derivation process). This means that, as before, we need algorithms to (i) setup
the system, (ii) assign keys to users, and (iii) perform key derivation. And, from a
user perspective, the interaction with the system consists of two phases:
(i) At the time of signing up, the user obtains secret keys that correspond to the
area R to which access is being granted.
(ii) When the user would like to obtain access to a certain cell within R, she will
use her secret keys (in combination with the public data made available by the
server) to independently derive the access key for that cell. It is assumed that
access to that key will permit her to either access the area or access information
about the area, based on the context.
The security of a geo-spatial key assignment scheme is deﬁned in a standard way.
That is, we require the properties of completeness and soundness to hold, as deﬁned
below:
Completeness A user with access privileges to a rectangular area R is able to com-
pute the access key for each cell within R.
Soundness Any coalition of users with access to rectangle areas R1, ..., Rk is unable
to obtain access to any cell other than those contained in R1 ∪ ··· ∪ Rk.
As was mentioned above, the key assignment can be such that each cell obtains a
unique key, but for eﬃciency reasons it might be advisable to assign the same key to
multiple cells (when access to a certain area is always granted as whole and not at the
level of individual cells). The fact that parts of the grid might have diﬀerent access
granularity (i.e., the level of individual cells versus the level of blocks of cells) will
allow us to achieve signiﬁcant savings in the data structure and key derivation time
in certain systems. However, we initially consider the case where the n1n2 cells have106
distinct access rights (hence there needs to be a separate key for each cell). Later
we discuss the case when groups of grid cells share a key (i.e., there are disjoint,
arbitrarily shaped regions of the grid, and each region has its own key).
Our result. If 4HS one-dimensional scheme is used as the underlying scheme for
our construction, for an n1 × n2 grid of cells that have distinct keys, a user who is
entitled to access a rectangular sub-grid R of such cells is given a constant number
of private keys, from which the key of any cell in R can be derived in constant time.
Moreover, given any such R, it is possible to compute the private keys for it in
constant time as well. The public storage space that the server needs to maintain is
O(n1n2(loglogn1)2 log
∗ n1). Throughout this chapter, we assume that 4HS is used in
the constructions and provide performance analysis according to the bounds of this
scheme. Similar analysis can be carried out with out underlying schemes as well.
6.2 A Preliminary Scheme
In this section we examine the solution that follows from the results of Chapter 4.
While the shortcut solution given in Chapter 4 performs well for general graphs, it
does not exploit the spatial structure. As a result, more eﬃcient solutions are possible,
and we will use the scheme described in this section to build such a solution.
Chapter 4 provides a key derivation mechanism for a graph of dimension d. In
the geo-spatial domain, we can represent each rectangular area on the grid by the
coordinates of its four corners. For each corner, we can use its coordinates to form
a total order relationship, which for all of them results in four total orders. By
incorporating all possible rectangular sub-areas of the grid, we obtain a graph of
dimension d = 4 to which the techniques of Chapter 4 can be applied.
Let us denote a cell by its x and y coordinates. A rectangular region R within
the grid is described by two x coordinates a ≤ b and two y coordinates c ≤ d, i.e.,
by a 4-tuple representation (a,b,c,d), where (a,c) is R’s bottom-left corner and (b,d)
is R’s top-right corner. If R is a single cell, then a = b and c = d. For instance, in107
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Figure 6.1. Illustration of regions on the spatial grid with n1 = 9 and n2 = 8.
Figure 6.1 Region I has coordinates (7, 7, 7, 7), Region II has coordinates (2, 6, 3,
6), Region III has coordinates (4, 6, 4, 5), etc.
Next, we create an N2 (= n2
1n2
2) node graph G whose vertices correspond to all
possible rectangles of the grid. That is, each vertex v in G is associated with a
rectangle R(v) whose bottom-left corner is (a(v),c(v)) and whose top-right corner is
(b(v),d(v)). For reasons that will become apparent soon, we associate with such a
vertex v the 4-tuple:
τ(v) = (n2 − a(v),b(v),n1 − c(v),d(v)).
To illustrate this function on an example, we go back to Figure 6.1. Here if we
associate node v1 with Rectangle I, node v2 with Rectangle II, and node v3 with Rect-
angle III, then we have τ(v1) = (1,7,2,7), τ(v2) = (6,6,6,6) and τ(v3) = (4,6,5,5).
Note that we have nodes in G and the corresponding values of the τ function for all
possible rectangles on the grid.
Now observe that rectangle R(v) contains rectangle R(w) if and only if all 4 of
the following inequalities hold:
a(v) ≤ a(w), b(w) ≤ b(v), c(v) ≤ c(w), d(w) ≤ d(v)
This is equivalent to:108
n1 − a(v) ≥ n1 − a(w), b(v) ≥ b(w),
n2 − c(v) ≥ n2 − c(w), d(v) ≥ d(w)
which is the same as τ(v) ≥ τ(w). Hence rectangle R(v) contains rectangle R(w)
if and only if τ(v) ≥ τ(w). This is also true when R(w) is a single cell, i.e., when
a(w) = b(w) and c(w) = d(w).
We now describe the edge set of G: there is an edge in G from vertex v to vertex
w if and only if τ(v) ≥ τ(w), i.e., every one of the 4 components of the 4-tuple τ(v)
is greater than or equal to the corresponding component of τ(w). Using rectangles
from Figure 6.1, there will be an edge from R(v2) to R(v3), but no edges between any
other ordered pair of the four rectangles depicted in the ﬁgure.
Now we have a 4-dimensional partial order G in which it is desired that v can
derive the key of w if and only if v precedes w in G. Thus, we can use the solution
of Chapter 4 to solve the problem with performance of 1 key, constant key derivation
time, and O(N2(logN)3 log
∗ N) space.
The following sections improve the performance of this data structure and result
in a scheme that does not require the quadratic space while maintaining the constant
number of keys and the constant key derivation computation.
6.3 Special Cases
Before presenting our scheme for the general case, we cover special cases. Solutions
to these special cases will be used in the overall construction for the general case. The
special cases considered in this section are rectangles that have less than 4 degrees of
freedom, i.e., each of them shares one or more of its 4 sides with the boundary of the
grid.
6.3.1 Rectangles that Span the Grid
Let us ﬁrst consider rectangles that span the whole width or whole height of the
n1 × n2 grid. This happens in one of two ways:109
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Figure 6.2. Illustration of rectangles that span the grid vertically and horizontally.
• Vertical spanning: The top and bottom boundaries of the rectangle are at rows
1 and (respectively) n1.
• Horizontal spanning: The left and right boundaries of the rectangle are at
columns 1 and (respectively) n2.
Figure 6.2 illustrates such rectangles.
Given that users can only obtain access to rectangles that span the grid, our goal
is to build a data structure that will permit a user to possess a small number of secret
keys and derive access key to each cell of her region R. Without loss of generality, we
give a solution for the case of horizontal spanning, and the case of vertical spanning
can be addressed analogously.
In this special case, we can treat every row as a single “super-cell,” ignoring the
fact that it consists of many cells. Thus, we assign a key to each row, and this turns
the problem into a problem with a single parameter. That is, now the only parameter
that can change is the number of rows in user rectangle R. This makes it possible
to apply the techniques of Chapter 5 for contiguous time sequences. In the current
context, we allow a user to obtain access to a contiguous set of rows with each row
having a diﬀerent key. In other words, now the n1 rows play the role the m time
units played in Chapter 5. Then a user with access to a rectangle that spans the grid
obtains secret keys created according to the solution of Section 5.3.
The above solution allows us to obtain the data structure of size O(n1loglogn1 ×
log
∗ n1) with the distance between any node and its descendant being at most a110
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Figure 6.3. Illustration of rectangles that touch a grid’s boundary.
constant number of edges. Note that none of the above characteristics depend on n2,
even though the grid is n1 × n2.
The case of vertical (rather than horizontal) spanning is treated similarly to the
above, except that the roles of rows and columns are interchanged, as are the roles of
n1 and n2. Thus, the space complexity for vertical spanning is O(n2 loglogn2 log
∗ n2).
6.3.2 Rectangles that Share a Grid Boundary
Next, we consider rectangles that share at least one of their boundaries with a
grid’s boundary. This means that at least one of the bounding four coordinates of
each rectangle of this type is in the set {1,n1,n2}. Figure 6.3 shows examples of such
rectangles.
We use “row” as an abbreviation for “y coordinate” and “column” as an abbrevia-
tion for “x coordinate.” Without loss of generality, assume that the rectangle touches
the right boundary of the grid, i.e., its right side is at column n2 as in the second
grid from the left in Figure 6.3. We call such a problem right-anchored, and the other
three cases are analogously referred to as left-, top-, or bottom-anchored.
Our solution to the right-anchored case consists of applying a solution to one-
dimensional graphs from Chapter 4 to cells in each row (because key derivation is
unidirectional in this case, i.e., from a certain point to the boundary). And we also
apply the solution of Chapter 5 to each column (in this case, key derivation must
be bounded by two points and key derivation is permitted within that interval only,111
just like in Chapter 5 for an interval of time). The algorithm for building the data
structure is then as follows:
1. For each individual row i of the grid, we create a one-dimensional structure Hi
that allows any position j in that row to have a short path to any other position
j0 of that same row iﬀ j < j0.
2. For each individual column j of the grid, we use the single-parameter structure,
call it Vj, of Chapter 5 to permit key derivation between any two positions i
and i0 (i < i0) in that column.
User Key Assignment and Derivation
Let a user be given access rights to a right-anchored rectangle R, the leftmost
column of which is j. Then the user is given the keys that correspond to the set
of rows of R from Vj. Derivation of the key of the cell at location (i0,j0) within R
consists of using the user’s secret keys and the Vj structure to obtain the key for the
cell (i0,j) at the same column, and then Hi0 structure of that row to derive the target
key for cell (i0,j0).
Performance
The data structure built in Step 1 of the above algorithm for a single row has the
characteristics of one secret key per user, constant key derivation time, and the size of
the data structure (public storage) of O(n2 log
∗ n2) space. The total space for all rows
is O(n1n2 log
∗ n2). The data structure built in Step 2 of the algorithm achieves, for a
single column, a constant number of secret user keys, constant key derivation time,
and O(n1loglogn1 log
∗ n1) storage space for the data structure. The total public
storage space for all columns is then O(n1n2 loglogn1 log
∗ n1) with constant-time key
derivation.112
The case of left-anchored rectangles is handled very similar to the case of right-
anchored rectangles. The only diﬀerence is in Step 1 of the algorithm, where the
data structure built should permit key derivation from a cell at position j to a cell at
position j0 iﬀ j > j0. For top-anchored and bottom-anchored rectangles, the solution
will consists of the roles of rows and columns reversed in the original algorithm. That
is, we apply the solution of Chapter 4 to each column, and the solution of Chapter 5
to each row.
6.4 The General Case: The Initial Solution
This section describes our initial scheme for the general case of rectangles R with
no assumptions other than that they must be contained within the n1 × n2 grid. In
Section 6.5 we show how to lower the space complexity associated with the storage
required for the data structure.
Here we ﬁrst describe in Section 6.4.1 how to build the data structure that permits
eﬃcient key derivation. This computation must be performed when the geo-spatial
system is being setup. Then we show in Section 6.4.2 how, given a rectangle area
R access to which is to be granted to a user, user secret keys are generated. This
procedure is performed at the time a user joins the system and grants access privileges
to access area R. Lastly, given access to R, we show in Section 6.4.3 how a user can
obtain keys for a cell contained in R. It is assumed that access to such a key enables
the user to obtain access to the area or information about the area, depending on the
context.
6.4.1 The Data Structure
Now we describe how, for a grid S, to build the public tree data structure, which
we will use for key management. Without loss of generality, we assume n1 = 22s113
and n2 = 22q, where s ≥ q.1 The algorithm for building the data structure takes, as
inputs, a node v and an n1 × n2 grid S. It builds a tree for S rooted at v, using a
recursive construction.
The idea behind it is to partition the grid into tiles of size
√
n1 ×
√
n2 each, and
apply the (preliminary) scheme of Section 6.2 on them treating each tile as a giant
cell. Such a data structure will be able to handle key assignment and derivation at
the granularity of tiles: now only rectangles that consist of a whole number of tiles are
supported. Then the algorithm builds support for the special cases of Section 6.3 on
the grid. In more detail, it builds data structures to support rectangles that border
the boundary of the grid or span (vertically or horizontally) across one or more tiles.
Finally, the algorithm is invoked recursively on each of the tiles to build the equivalent
data structures at ﬁner levels of granularity.
DataStructBuild(v,S):
1. If n2 = 2 (i.e., q = 0), then S consists of two columns of length n1 each. For
each of these columns, create and store at node v the data structure for the n1
cells described in Chapter 5 (which will permit key assignment and derivation
for any contiguous set of cells within those n1 cells).
2. Partition S into a
√
n1 ×
√
n2 array of tiles Si,j, 1 ≤ i ≤
√
n1 and 1 ≤ j ≤
√
n2,
where each tile is itself a
√
n1 ×
√
n2 grid. That is, Si,j consists of the cells of S
whose row number is in the interval [(i − 1)
√
n1 + 1,i
√
n1] and whose column
number is in the interval [(j − 1)
√
n2 + 1,j
√
n2]. Create a node vi,j for each
Si,j, and make vi,j a child of v.
3. Generate a grid C(v), derived from S by treating each Si,j as a single cell (i.e.,
“merging” the cells of Si,j into a single unit). Note that C(v) is
√
n1 ×
√
n2.
1Note that these assumptions are for presentation purposes only, and our data structures can easily
be generalized to other grids that are not of this form. That is, it is not necessary to increase the
actual size of the grid to obtain n1 and n2 of the above form, but instead rounding can be used in
computing partitions of the grid.114
.  .  .
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Figure 6.4. Illustration of building the data structure for a grid 16×9
(ﬁrst level of recursion).
4. Store at node v the scheme of Section 6.2 for C(v), which we denote by D(v).
D(v) will allow for user key assignment and derivation at the granularity of tiles,
i.e., it can process a rectangle only if that rectangle is the union of a subset of
the Si,j’s, but it cannot handle rectangles whose corners are inside the Si,j’s.
5. Also store at node v a solution for each of the 4 “anchored” special cases (rect-
angles that have at least 1 side along a boundary for S). Call these struc-
tures AL(v) for rectangles anchored at the left, AR(v), AT(v), and AB(v) for
rectangles anchored at the right, top, and bottom, respectively. Having these
structures enables the handling of anchored rectangles.
6. Let HSi,j0,j00, where 1 ≤ i ≤
√
n1 and 1 ≤ j0 ≤ j00 ≤
√
n2, be the horizontal slab
consisting of the union of all of the tiles Si,j0,Si,j0+1,...,Si,j00. For every such
HSi,j0,j00, we store at v a “horizontal spanning” structure of Section 6.3.1 for115
processing rectangles that horizontally span it. Since there are
√
n1 choices for
i and
√
n2 choices for each of j0,j00, the total number of such slabs is n2
√
n1. We
denote by H(v) the information stored at v for all of these O(n2
√
n1) horizontal
slabs. H(v) can handle any rectangle that horizontally spans any one of those
slabs.
7. Similarly, let VSi0,i00,j, 1 ≤ i0 ≤ i00 ≤
√
n2, be the vertical slab consisting of the
union of all of the tiles Si0,j,Si0+1,j,...,Si00,j. For every such VSi0,i00,j, we store at
v a “vertical spanning” structure for processing rectangles that vertically span
it. The number of such slabs is n1
√
n2. We denote by V (v) the information
stored at v for all of these vertical slabs. V (v) can handle any rectangle that
vertically spans any one of those slabs.
8. Recursively apply the scheme to each child of v, i.e., call DataStructBuild(vi,j,Si,j)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤
√
n1 and 1 ≤ j ≤
√
n2.
Now we analyze the performance of the data structure built. In Step 1, we ob-
tain a construction of O(n1loglogn1 log
∗ n1) space, a constant distance between
nodes, and a constant number of keys per user. In Step 4, the data structure
built has the space complexity of O(n1n2(logn1)3 log
∗ n1) with a constant distance
between nodes and one key per user. In Step 5, the construction gives us the
space complexity of O(n1n2 loglogn1) with a constant distance between nodes and
a constant number of user secret keys. In Step 6, we have that each structure
HSi,j0,j00 has space complexity of O(
√
n1 loglogn1 log
∗ n1), a constant number of keys
per user, and a constant distance between nodes. Since there are
√
n1 choices
for i and
√
n2 choices for each of j0,j00, the total space for all such structures is
O(n1n2 loglogn1 log
∗ n1). Finally, in Step 7, each structure VSi0,i00,j similarly has
space complexity of O(
√
n2 loglogn2 log
∗ n2), with the total space over all choices of
j, i0, and i00 being O(n2n1 loglogn2 log
∗ n2).116
Since Step 1 is at the bottom of the recursion, the total space satisﬁes the following
recurrence if n2 > 2:
f(n1,n2) ≤
√
n1n2f(
√
n1,
√
n2) + c1n1n2(logn1)
3 log
∗ n1
and f(n1,2) = c2n1 loglogn1 log
∗ n1, where c1 and c2 are constants. The solution to
it is f(n1,n2) = O(n1n2(logn1)3 loglogn1 log
∗ n1).
The above “augmented tree” data structure (call it G) is used to set up the
system, i.e., we associate with each node of G a key, and we create public information
associated with each edge (v,w) in G that allows anyone with v’s key to derive w’s
key in one simple step.
In addition to the above data structure, the server will need to maintain public
information associated with another, simple graph that maps keys corresponding
to tiles to cell keys. A description of such an auxiliary data structure is given in
Section 6.4.3 where we explain how key derivation is performed.
6.4.2 Key Assignment
We now turn our attention to describing how keys are assigned to a user who is
being granted access to a rectangle area of cells R. In what follows, v is the root node
of the above tree data structure, S is the n1×n2 grid associated with v (with n1 ≥ n2),
and R is an arbitrary rectangle in S. Although we can ultimately achieve computing
the key assignment of any such R in constant time, we begin with describing a key
assignment algorithm that does so in O(loglogn2) time.
Initial Key Assignment Mechanism
Given a user’s rectangle R, the recursive procedure below returns a constant-size
set of secret user keys that will permit access to R. The algorithm majorly follows
the data structure built using DataStructBuild to ﬁnd the largest blocks of cells, keys
for which are encoded in the data structure.117
R2
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Step 2c
Step 2d
Step 2a
R1
R3
Figure 6.5. Illustration of the spatial key assignment procedure for
various user rectangles. The color of an area indicates where in the
AssignKeys algorithm the area is handled.
AssignKeys(R,v,S):
1. If v is not a leaf, continue with the next step. Otherwise, n2 = 2 with a small
n1, and the data structure at v stores two solutions to the single-parameter
problem of n1 cells (one for each column). If R consists of a single column,
we retrieve from the data structure corresponding to that column the keys that
permit access to the range of R’s rows. If R consists of two columns, we retrieve
such keys from both data structures. Return the keys computed.
2. Recall from the algorithm that builds the data structure that the vi,j’s are the
children of v, and that Si,j is the
√
n1 ×
√
n2 tile associated with node vi,j. We
distinguish diﬀerent cases, based on how R overlaps with the Si,j’s:
(a) If R overlaps with only one Si,j, then we recursively call AssignKeys(R,vi,j,
Si,j) and return the keys returned by that recursive call. Otherwise, con-
tinue with the next steps.
(b) Let R1 be the maximal sub-rectangle of R that consists of the union of
one or more Si,j’s. If no such R1 exists, then continue to the next step.118
Otherwise, obtain the key for R1 from the D(v) structure stored at v (by
indexing into it in constant time).
(c) Let R2 be any of the maximal sub-rectangles of R that (i) are disjoint
from R1, and (ii) horizontally or vertically span one of the slabs HSi,j0,j00
or VSi0,i00,j. There can be at most 2 such horizontally spanning R2’s (a top
and a bottom one), and at most 2 vertically spanning R2’s (a left and a
right one). For each of such R2’s we obtain, in constant time, O(1) keys
by using the H(v) or V (v) structure stored at v.
(d) The previous steps have considered all but the “corners” of R, each of
which could lie inside an Si,j. Then let R3 be any of the maximal sub-
rectangles of R that contain a corner of R and are disjoint from R1 and
R2’s of the previous steps. Note that there will be at most four but could
be fewer than four such R3’s, when, for instance, such an R3 contains 2
corners of R (when both corners lie within the same Si,j).
Each R3 is surely “anchored,” therefore the O(1) keys for it can be obtained
in constant time from one of the four structures AL(v), AR(v), AT(v), and
AB(v). That is, we ﬁrst index to the appropriate Vj data structure for
left- and right-anchored rectangles (and Hj for top- and bottom-anchored
rectangles) and then retrieve the right keys from it in constant time (as in
Chapter 5).
(e) Return the keys computed in the previous three steps.
The diﬀerent cases of Step 2 of this algorithm are depicted in Figure 6.5. The
above procedure assigns a constant number of keys per rectangle R and does so
in O(loglogn2) time. In the next subsection we sketch a modiﬁcation that brings the
time down to constant.
As can be seen from above, Step 2b of the AssignKeys procedure returns from
D(v) keys associated with tiles, but not with individual cells. When users, however,
want to obtain access to cells, they will need to have keys associated with those cells.119
For that reason, the server must maintain a mapping from tile keys to the keys that
compose the corresponding tiles. The data structure that allows such mapping is
explained in Section 6.4.3 along with the key derivation process.
Constant-Time Key Assignment Mechanism
The above AssignKeys procedure takes longer than constant time because we are
going down the tree G (working with blocks of ﬁner granularity) until we ﬁnd the node
u at which R overlaps with more than one Si,j. To achieve O(1) time performance for
key assignment, we need to ﬁnd this u is constant time. This can be done as follows:
1. Let cells c1,c2,c3,c4 be the four corners of R. For every ci, let `(ci) denote the
leaf of G that contains ci.
2. Use the constant-time algorithm for computing nearest common ancestors (NCA)
in a tree [92] to compute the lowest (i.e., farthest from the root) node of G which
is an ancestor of all of `(c1), `(c2), `(c3), and `(c4). That node is the u we seek.
6.4.3 Constant-Time Key Derivation
The above key assignment process could also be used to guide the processing of a
key derivation request. But before we proceed with giving it, we describe an auxiliary
data structure, G0, that will allow users to map keys associated with tiles to cell keys.
Given the augmented tree G, G0 is constructed as follows:
1. Starting with the root node v of G and going down the tree, add to the set of
nodes of G0 a node associated with each tile in C(v).
2. Add to the set of nodes of G0 a node for each cell of S.
3. For each node of G0 that corresponds to a tile, insert an edge from it to every
cell contained in that tile.120
Given the above graph G0, we assign a fresh unique public label to every node of it as
in the key derivation mechanisms of Chapter 3. We then use the corresponding secret
keys from G to compute public information associated with G0. Now each user who
obtains a key for a tile in S will be able to use the public information for G0 to obtain
the key for any cell within that tile. The space complexity of G0 is O(n1n2 loglogn1),
which is lower than that of G.
Going back to the user key derivation procedure, we have that a user with secret
keys for an area R should be able to obtain the key of a cell within R using the
public information associated with the augmented tree G and the additional graph
G0 above. To do so, the user locates (in constant time using the NCA algorithm, as
in the previous sub-section) the node u at which R overlaps with more than one Si,j.
Having u, the user derives the key depending on whether the target grid cell is in an
R1 (Step 2b), an R2 (Step 2c), or an R3 (Step 2d). All that is needed to carry out
the constant-time derivation of the target cell’s key is the local information stored at
node u, i.e., AL(u), AR(u), AT(u), AB(u), H(u), V (u), or data structures stored at
leaves. The only exception is the case when the key is returned from D(u) in Step
2b. In this case, such a key will correspond to a tile, but not to an individual cell.
This means that the user will need to refer to G0 to compute the cell’s key from the
tile key obtained above (by following one edge in G0).
An alternative way to the use of NCA computations in locating u would be to
provide the user who possesses access rights to R with a pointer to the node u, thereby
allowing constant access to that node whenever that user needs to do key derivation.
6.5 Improving the Space Complexity
We now give an improvement in the space complexity of the solution. The im-
proved scheme looks just like the initial scheme of Section 6.4, except that in Step 4 of
DataStructBuild(v,S), instead of using the preliminary scheme of Section 6.2 for C(v),
it uses the better scheme of Section 6.4. This implies that the space for Step 4 of121
DataStructBuild reduces to
√
n1
√
n2(logn1)3 loglogn1 log
∗ n1, which is dominated by
the O(n1n2 loglogn1 log
∗ n1) space for other structures AL(v), AR(v), AT(v), AB(v),
H(v), and V (v). The recurrence for the total space thus becomes for n > 2:
f(n1,n2) ≤
√
n1n2f(
√
n1,
√
n2) + c1n1n2 loglogn1 log
∗ n1
and f(n1,2) = c2n1 loglogn1 log
∗ n1, where c1 and c2 are constants. The solution is
f(n1,n2) = O(n1n2(loglogn1)2 log
∗ n1).
As was mentioned earlier, in practice it is quite likely that not every cell will have
its own distinct access key, and that groups of cells may have the same key. The
easiest way to exploit this structure is for the recursive construction of G to stop as
soon as its corresponding sub-grid consists of cells that all have the same key. That
is, Step 1 of DataStructBuild needs to contain a termination test for when all of the
n1n2 cells share the same key (in which case it stops even if n2 > 2). This is likely to
result in less space that the worst-case theoretical bound we showed, especially when
the cells that share a key tend to be contiguous (but not when they form a checkered
pattern). We can quantify the improvement if we make assumptions about the shapes
of those sub-regions of cells that share the same key (e.g., assume a rectangular shape),
which cannot be done without a speciﬁc application and setup parameters and usage
patterns in mind.
The security of our construction is due to the key derivation mechanism used,
which provides an appropriate protection mechanism for any DAG, and not due to
the details of the data structure we build.
6.6 Handling Updates
It was already described earlier how keys are issued to a new user, therefore this
section focuses on what happens when: (i) a cell’s key is modiﬁed or (ii) a user’s
access rights are revoked. These issues were treated in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4) for
hierarchical access control systems, and the same basic techniques work for the geo-
spatial problem considered here.122
Recall from Chapter 3 that we can use the extended scheme to avoid re-keying
many users when a cell’s key changes, because the scheme separates user secret infor-
mation from the access keys. This approach avoids having to re-key every user who
shares access to a cell with the revoked user, but there is still a need to re-key users
who share the same key (from the data structures) with the user who is being revoked.
In some environments, however, re-keying even a single user is expensive (or simply
not possible). In such environments it is possible, using techniques of Section 3.4, to
not require rekeying of any user for revocation. In more detail, each user is now given
her own node in the public structure, and edges are added to the public structure
from the user’s node to the nodes containing keys for that user. Now one can change
the keys for the underlying structure and can update the user’s keys by modifying
only public information. An added beneﬁt of this approach is that each user needs to
store only a single key. Note that this beneﬁt comes as a cost: the public structure
now grows linearly as the number of users increases.
6.7 Extensions
The scheme we gave extends to higher dimensions: Every additional dimension
causes an additional loglogN factor in the space complexity, an extra constant num-
ber steps in key derivation, and a multiplicative constant factor in the number of
keys. Therefore for a dimension d problem, we obtain:
(i) The number of keys is O(cd) for some constant c (and thus is only eﬃciently
applicable when the number of dimensions is small);
(ii) The key derivation time becomes O(d);
(iii) The space complexity becomes O(N(loglogN)d log
∗ N).123
7 CONCLUSIONS
This work presents a comprehensive study of key management problem in systems
where user privileges are based on hierarchical relationship between diﬀerent classes.
We addressed key management in the following contexts:
Hierarchies of user classes. Despite a large volume of work on hierarchical key
assignment schemes, our scheme is the ﬁrst solution that achieves provable
security and supports arbitrary changes to the hierarchy without the need for
key re-distribution to the current users. Our solution is also one of the most
eﬃcient and at the same time simple solutions to date.
In addition, our techniques for improving key derivation time by inserting of
additional, shortcut, edges resulted in the possibility of applying key assignment
solutions to a wider range of hierarchies and support for even very weak clients.
These techniques were also proven very useful in extending the key management
solutions to time- and space-based policies.
Time-based access control in hierarchical systems. In hierarchical systems, where
time is partitioned into short intervals and access keys and privileges change
during each time intervals, we present a solution that allows a user to join
the system for a (possibly unique) consecutive set of time intervals while pre-
serving user access privileges based on the hierarchical relationship between
classes. Our solution provides a balance between the number of user keys, key
derivation computation, and server requirements, resulting in very competitive
performance.
Geo-spatial access control. By extending the notion of one-dimensional time to
higher dimensions, we were able to construct key management solutions in the124
geo-spatial context as well. That is, we are given space partitioned into cells, and
a user obtains access to a sub-area within the grid. Our solution heavily relies
on the structured nature of cells and user access rights allowing for solutions
with low overheads.
As a direction of future research, key management in ﬁle and storage systems appears
as a promising direction for pursuing work. In particular, the inherently hierarchi-
cal structure of user directories and ﬁles makes it a natural ﬁt for hierarchical key
management solutions. As an evidence of potential in this research direction, the
work of Grolimund et al. on ﬁle systems [99] was inspired by our work on user hi-
erarchies [10]. Furthermore, users themselves are likely to be organized into groups
resulting in application of key management techniques at both the levels of users
and levels of resources. The drastic diﬀerent in design principles, however, is that
in ﬁle and storage systems users control their own data (there is no a single central
authority anymore); they have read and write access to the data (instead of only read
privileges); and users may grant access to their data to other users. Such diﬀerences
are likely to require new key management techniques that are worth investigation.LIST OF REFERENCES125
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